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& Steven Utke****
Voting rights are a basic shareholder-protection
mechanism. Outside of the core voting requirements state law
imposes (election of directors and votes on fundamental
changes), federal law grants shareholders additional voting
rights. But these rights introduce concomitant costs into
corporate governance. Each grant of a voting right thus
invites the question: is the benefit achieved worth the cost the
vote imposes?
The question is not merely a theoretical one. Recently,
the SEC, concerned about NASDAQ's potential weakening of
shareholder voting protections, has lamented that little
evidence exists on the value of the shareholder vote. This
Article provides that evidence. It examines the
implementation of a NASDAQ shareholder voting rule to
identify the associated costs and benefits of requiring the
approval of acquisitions by the acquiring firm's shareholders.
It find firms alter the structure of their acquisitions to avoid
shareholder voting. On its own, this finding could suggest
self-serving behavior-managers may be avoiding
shareholder votes to effectuate suboptimal transactions at the
shareholders' expense. Yet this Article find no difference
between returns to acquisitions that require a shareholder
vote and to those that do not. This lack of a difference
suggests that, on average, for acquiring shareholders the costs
outweigh the benefits associated with shareholder voting.
Such results suggest that regulators and exchanges alike
should be cautious when imposing shareholder voting
requirements. The shareholder franchise, a relatively blunt
and costly instrument, is best suited to fundamental
corporate changes and director elections.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The issue of the value of the shareholder franchise is a perennial
question in corporate law.' Shareholders generally play only a
limited role in the governance of a corporation; they mostly rely on
the directors they elect to serve as their representatives on the board
and only vote on a few fundamental events in a corporation's life.2
1. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Case for Limited Shareholder Voting
Rights, 53 UCLA L. REV. 601, 602 (2006); Lucian A- Bebchuk, The Myth of the
Shareholder Franchise, 93 VA. L. REV. 675, 676 (2007); K.A.D. Camara,
Shareholder Voting and the Bundling Problem in Corporate Law, 2004 WIS. L.
REV. 1425, 1428 (2004); Colleen A- Dunlavy, Social Conceptions of the
Corporation: Insights from the History of Shareholder Voting Rights, 63 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 1347, 1347 (2006); Paul H. Edelman et al., Shareholder Voting in an
Age of Intermediary Capitalism, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 1359, 1359 (2014); Henry
Hansmann & Mariana Pargendler, The Evolution of Shareholder Voting Rights:
Separation of Ownership and Consumption, 123 YALE L.J. 948, 948 (2014); Grant
M. Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie, One Share, One Vote and the False Promise of
Shareholder Homogeneity, 30 CARDozo L. REV. 445, 446 (2008); Joshua R.
Mourning, The Majority-Voting Movement: Curtailing Shareholder
Disenfranchisement in Corporate Director Elections, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1143,
1143 (2007); Ren6 Reich-Graefe, Deconstructing Corporate Governance: Absolute
Director Primacy, 5 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 341, 341 (2011); Mark J. Roe,
The Corporate Shareholder's Vote and Its Political Economy, in Delaware and in
Washington, 2 HARV. Bus. L. REV. 1, 1 (2012).
2. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy in Corporate Takeovers:
Preliminary Reflections, 55 STAN. L. REV. 791, 801 n.60 (2002) ("Formal
shareholder control rights in fact are so weak that they scarcely qualify as part
of corporate governance. Under the Delaware code, for example, shareholder
voting rights are essentially limited to the election of directors and approval of
charter or bylaw amendments, mergers, sales of substantially all of the
corporation's assets, and voluntary dissolution.').
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Acquisitions are a lopsided example of this norm; typically,
shareholders of target corporations vote on any buyout offer, but
acquiring shareholders-at least by statute-do not have a
corresponding vote on acquisitions. 3
However, exchange requirements have altered this statutory
baseline. Beginning in 1989, NASDAQ required acquiring firms
listed on its exchange to obtain shareholder approval in order to issue
25% or more of the acquirer's outstanding stock in connection with an
acquisition.4 But in 2015, NASDAQ announced it was considering
revising these rules.5 NASDAQ believed the existing rule, while
potentially providing important shareholder protections, may have
been overly restrictive in light of changes in capital markets and
investor protections. 6 In the wake of NASDAQ's announcement, the
Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") expressed concern
about NASDAQ potentially weakening the existing shareholder
voting rule and noted that little evidence exists on the consequences
of this rule, making the potential implications of any changes
unknown.7
This lack of evidence is all the more troubling because the vote in
question falls outside the traditional core shareholder franchise.
State statutes traditionally allow shareholders to vote in a limited
number of settings-mainly to elect directors-but also in situations
that amend the articles of incorporation or where the firm is being
acquired or is dissolving.8 Except for these areas, the board of
directors retains the discretion to manage the corporation. 9
3. Mary Siegel, An Appraisal of the Model Business Corporation Act's
Appraisal Rights Provisions, 74 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 231, 232 & n.8 (2011).
4. Order Approving Proposed Rule Change Relating to Eligibility Criteria
for NASDAQ National Market System Securities, 54 Fed. Reg. 1463, 1464 & n.5
(Jan. 13, 1989). NASDAQ enacted a stricter 20% threshold in 1990. See infra
Part II. Our main tests involve difference-in-difference tests examining the
period before the enactment of the 25% rule and after the enactment of the 20%
rule. We also perform additional analysis around both thresholds separately and
find results consistent with our main analysis.
5. NASDAQ, SOLICITATION OF COMMENTS BY THE NASDAQ LISTING AND
HEARING REVIEW COUNCIL ABOUT SHAREHOLDER APPROVAL RULES (2015),
https://listingcenter.NASDAQ.com/assets/Shareholder%20Approval
%20Comment%2oSolicitation.pdf [hereinafter 2015 NASDAQ COMMENTS
SOLICITATION]; Press Release, NASDAQ, NASDAQ Requests Comments for
Shareholder Approval Rules (Nov. 18, 2015), http://ir.NASDAQ.com/releasedetail
.cfm?releaseid=943415.
6. Press Release, NASDAQ, supra note 5.
7. Letter from Rick A- Fleming, Office of the Inv'r Advocate, SEC, to Stanley
Higgins, Senior Director, Listing Qualifications, NASDAQ Stock Market LLC
(Feb. 12, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/about/offices/investorad/comment-letter
-investor-advocate-nasdaq-021216.pdf [hereinafter Office of the Inv'r Advocate
Letter].
8. Edelman et al., supra note 1, at 1367.
9. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2018); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.01(b)
(AM. BAR ASS'N 2016); Michael S. Kang, Shareholder Voting as Veto, 88 IND. L.J.
1299, 1306 (2013).
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Over time, federal law in the form of securities regulation and
SEC-approved rules imposed by self-regulatory organizations
("SROs")-notably NASDAQ and the New York Stock Exchange
("NYSE")-have increased the scope of the shareholder franchise. 10
Shareholders today vote on executive pay,1 for example, and a host
of proxy proposals. 12 Critics argue that these votes impose real costs
on corporations and thus on shareholders. 13
Time Inc.'s purchase of Warner Communications exemplifies the
costs a shareholder vote can impose-and the lengths that managers
will go to avoid one. In September 1988, Time initiated a stock-swap
merger with Warner that eventually fell through.' 4 The following
March, the boards of both firms approved a merger, with the planned
merger structured as a $9 billion stock swap. 15 The swap would have
required the issuance of over 20% of Time's outstanding stock, thus
requiring a shareholder vote.' 6
In June, Paramount Communications emerged as a hostile
acquirer of Time. 17 To avoid being purchased, Time's management
both increased the offer amount and changed the method of payment
for Warner.' 8  Rather than maintain the original stock-swap
structure, Time made a cash offer-funded in part by debt-of $13.1
billion, thereby avoiding a vote by Time's shareholders. 19 For Time's
managers, the cost associated with a stockholder vote was that of
delay and its attendant uncertainty.20 They neatly avoided that cost
by taking on $7-$10 billion in debt rather than suffer the risk and
10. See, e.g., NASDAQ, STOCK MARKET RULES r. 5635 (2018),
http://nasdaq.cchwallstreet.com/NASDAQTools/PlatformViewer.asp
?selectednode=chp%5Fl%5F1%5F4%5F3%5F8%5F24&manual=%2Fnasdaq
%2Fmain%2Fnasdaq%2Dequityrules%2F; N.Y. STOCK EXCH., LISTED COMPANY
MANUAL § 312.03 (2018), http://wallstreet.cch.com/LCMTools/PlatformViewer
.asp?selectednode=chp 14 123&manual=%2Flcm%2Fsections%2Flcm
-sections%2F.
11. Edelman et al., supra note 1, at 1379.
12. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Revitalizing SEC Rule 14a-8's Ordinary
Business Exclusion: Preventing Shareholder Micromanagement by Proposal, 85
FORDHAM L. REV. 705, 708-11 (2016); Edelman et al., supra note 1, at 1359-60.
13. Camara, supra note 1, at 1472-80.
14. Paramount Commc'ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1143-49 (Del.
1989).
15. Id. at 1146; David B. Hilder & Randall Smith, Proposed Stock Swap
Could be Vulnerable, WALL ST. J., Mar. 7, 1989, at C1.
16. Paramount Commc'ns, Inc., 571 A.2d at 1146.
17. Id. at 1147-48.
18. Id. at 1148.
19. Paramount Commc'ns Inc. v. Time Inc., Nos. 10866, 10670, and 10935,
1989 WL 79880, at *12 (Del. Ch. July 14, 1989), aff'd sub nom., Literary Partners,
L.P. v. Time Inc., 565 A.2d 280 (Del. 1989), and aff'd, 565 A.2d 280 (Del. 1989),
and afd sub nom., In re Time Inc. S'holder Litig., 565 A-2d 281 (Del. 1989); Bill
Saporito, The Inside Story of Time Warner, FORTUNE (Nov. 21, 2012),
http://fortune.com/2012/11/21/the-inside-story-of-time-warner/.
20. Paramount Commc'ns Inc., 1989 WL 79880, at *14-16.
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delay of a shareholder vote.21  While the outcome of Time's
shareholder vote cannot be known because its management
successfully avoided the vote altogether, it is clear that undertaking
such a vote would have been costly, in terms of the probability of both
completing a transaction with Warner and avoiding being purchased
by Paramount. 22 As indicated by a negative market reaction-with
the stock price declining from a peak of $180.00 on June 13, 1989, to
$119.38 on January 10, 1990 (the day the merger closed)-Time's
shareholders might well have preferred to receive $200 per share
from Paramount rather than lose more than $60 per share in value
and take on considerable debt to purchase Warner.23
The Paramount Time-Warner episode neatly illustrates several
facets of the question regarding the costs and benefits of shareholder
voting. First, in order to reduce both uncertainty and delay, acquiring
managers may prefer to avoid a shareholder vote. Second, managers
avoiding a shareholder vote may be structuring suboptimal deals.
And third, in the United States (unlike in the United Kingdom, as
will be discussed in Subpart II.B.1), it is relatively easy for an
acquirer to avoid a shareholder vote despite regulators' efforts to
impose one. However, there may be benefits of voting to the extent
that shareholders can prevent value-destroying acquisitions that are
subject to a vote. Current arguments about the value of the vote are
dominated by anecdote rather than analysis. 24
This Article explores the introduction of a necessary vote by
acquiring-firm shareholders, as first implemented by NASDAQ in
1989, to investigate the costs and benefits of such a vote. First, to
examine the costs of the voting requirement, this Article tests
whether the introduction of the rule alters the way in which managers
structure acquisitions. Prior to 1989, NYSE and the American Stock
Exchange ("AMEX') already had rules in place analogous to the one
21. Id. at *15.
22. Id. at *14-16.
23. See Paul Richter, Time Warner Merger Still a Work in Progress: The
Company is Making Headway on Some Fronts but Questions Remain about
'Synergies' and $10.8 Billion in Takeover-Related Debt, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 6, 1991,
at D1 (noting that the stock continued to fall a year after the merger, dropping to
$87.25 by January 1991); Saporito, supra note 19. Another example of a firm
adjusting its deal structure to avoid shareholder voting involves Kraft Foods's
acquisition of Cadbury. Steven Davidoff Solomon, Warren Buffett's Lost Vote,
N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Jan. 21, 2010, 9:05 AM), https://dealbook.nytimes.com
/2010/01/21/warren-buffetts-lost-vote. Warren Buffett, a significant investor in
Kraft, openly opposed the merger. Id. In response, Kraft restructured the terms
of its offer to avoid a shareholder vote, reducing the amount of its stock used to
purchase Cadbury from greater than 20% to only 18%. Id.
24. See generally Camara, supra note 1; Edelman et al., supra note 1; Harry
G. Hutchison & R. Sean Alley, Against Shareholder Participation: A Treatment
for McConvill's Psychonomicosis, 2 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 41 (2007);
Minor Myers, The Perils of Shareholder Voting on Executive Compensation, 36
DEL. J. CORP. L. 417 (2011).
2018]
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NASDAQ adopted.25 This regulatory change, whereby NASDAQ
moved to synchronize its acquisition voting requirements with those
of its peer exchanges, offers a unique setting to evaluate the effect of
imposing a vote. Assuming that absent a shareholder voting rule,
managers use the most appropriate deal structure, this Article
examines whether the implementation of the shareholder voting rule
is associated with deviations from the preferred deal structure-
revealing an underexplored cost of granting acquiring shareholders
voting rights in acquisitions. To examine any such effect, this Article
compares the pre- and post-rule-change periods, testing whether
NASDAQ acquirers are less likely to issue an amount of stock in an
acquisition that, after the enactment of the shareholder voting rule,
would require shareholder approval. This comparison across the pre-
and post-rule-change periods helps isolate and examine the effect of
an acquirer voting requirement on firms previously not subject to it,
as compared to a sample of firms that were always subject to a voting
requirement.
The second examination challenges the above-articulated
assumption and considers whether managers may not act in
shareholders' best interest. Managers may issue shares in
acquisitions for reasons having more to do with self-interest (e.g.,
hubris or empire building) than with maximizing shareholder value. 26
If this self-interested motivation is present, then subjecting
acquisitions to a vote would allow shareholders an opportunity to
deny managers the ability to execute such value-destroying
transactions. Accordingly, this Article investigates whether the
presence of shareholder voting rules in acquisitions provides benefits
to acquiring-firm shareholders by improving the quality of
acquisitions as measured by short- and long-run returns.27
Specifically, this Article compares the announcement and long-run
returns surrounding acquisitions by NASDAQ, NYSE, and AMEX
firms in the period before and after the implementation of the
NASDAQ shareholder voting rules and tests for differences in returns
of similarly structured acquisitions.
NASDAQ acquirers are less likely to issue a number of shares
sufficient to trigger the shareholder voting requirement following the
25. Am. STOCK EXCH., COMPANY GUIDE §§ 712, 713 (1983); N.Y. STOCK. EXCH.,
LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 312.00 (1983).
26. Jennifer Arlen & Eric Talley, Unregulable Defenses and the Perils of
Shareholder Choice, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 577, 591 (2003); Stephen M. Bainbridge,
Exclusive Merger Agreements and Lock- Ups in Negotiated Corporate Acquisitions,
75 MINN. L. REV. 239, 272-75 (1990). See generally John C. Coffee, Jr.,
Shareholders Versus Managers: The Strain in the Corporate Web, 85 MICH. L.
REV. 1 (1986) (discussing the conflict of interest between shareholders and
managers).
27. See, e.g., Office of the Inv'r Advocate Letter, supra note 7 (arguing that
shareholder voting rules in acquisitions protect investors from harmful actions of
managers but noting that there is little evidence directly supporting this view.).
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passage of the voting rule. The results suggest a 45% decline in the
number of NASDAQ deals that would trigger shareholder voting
following the NASDAQ rule change. This change is consistent with
NASDAQ's suggestion that the existing rule imposes significant costs,
causing acquirers to alter their deal structure to avoid a shareholder
vote. 28 However, there is little evidence that imposing the voting rule
financially benefits acquiring shareholders. Passage of the rule did
not lead to significant increases in announcement returns for
NASDAQ-listed acquirers subject to the rule. We also find no
evidence of significant increases in post-acquisition long-run
performance. These performance results are consistent with concerns
that the costs associated with these rules outweigh the benefits. 29
NASDAQ also suggested that the voting rule may
disproportionately benefit firms not subject to strong outside
monitoring, as would exist in firms with relatively low levels of
institutional ownership.3 0 Using levels of institutional ownership as
a proxy for strong corporate governance, this Article finds in cross-
sectional analyses that results are consistent across poor- and good-
governance firms. This suggests that, contrary to regulators' views,
the effect of the shareholder voting rule does not vary with corporate
governance.3 1 Overall, the results suggest there are significant costs
but limited benefits to the shareholder voting rule as implemented by
NASDAQ.
This Article's analysis thus provides crucial new data at a time
when NASDAQ is currently considering revising its rules on
shareholder voting. This data provides the first direct evidence on
the value of the NASDAQ shareholder voting rule. Beyond this
immediate impact, however, this Article's findings are important for
a number of other reasons. First, while several studies examine
factors that influence the method of payment in acquisitions, 32
28. See Press Release, NASDAQ, supra note 5.
29. See, e.g., Douglas C. Michael, Untenable Status of Corporate Governance
Listing Standards Under the Securities Exchange Act, 47 Bus. LAW. 1461, 1465-
69 (1992).
30. NASDAQ, SOLICITATION OF COMMENTS BY THE NASDAQ LISTING AND
HEARING REVIEW COUNCIL ABOUT THE DEFINITION OF MARKET VALUE FOR
PURPOSES OF SHAREHOLDER APPROVAL RULES 3 (2017),
https://listingcenter.NASDAQ.com/assets/Shareholder%2OApproval
%20Comment%20Solicitation%2OJune%2014%202017.pdf; 2015 NASDAQ
COMMENTS SOLICITATION, supra note 5, at 5.
31. A strength of examining NASDAQ's implementation of a new
shareholder voting rule is the ability to isolate the effect of the shareholder voting
rule itself-holding all else constant-which cannot be done using more recent
time periods. There seems to be no reason to believe that the results on voting
itself are not generalizable. However, this Article acknowledges that it is limited
in examining the interaction between voting and recent corporate governance
developments due to the time period examined.
32. See, e.g., Benjamin C. Ayers, Craig E. Lefanowicz & John R. Robinson,
Capital Gains Taxes and Acquisition Activity: Evidence of the Lock-in Effect, 24
CONTEMP. ACcT. RES. 315 (2007); David T. Brown & Michael D. Ryngaert, The
2018] 163
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comparatively little evidence exists on the role of shareholder voting
in such decisions.33 Second, the NASDAQ rule change provides a
clean setting to examine how shareholder voting rules affect
acquisitions by allowing an examination of a treatment group
(NASDAQ acquirers) and a control group (acquirers listed on other
exchanges that experienced no change in shareholder voting rules).
Though most of the acquisition literature ties the performance of
stock-financed transactions to overvaluation of the acquirer's stock,
34
this Article relates stock deals to shareholder voting. It tests whether
shareholder voting results in better acquisition decisions relative to
similar acquisitions not requiring shareholder approval, which is
important to shareholders, managers, and regulators. 35
In sum, our results provide two main contributions to the
literature. First, we examine the effect of shareholder voting rules on
the structure of acquisitions, finding evidence consistent with
acquiring-firm managers using their discretion to avoid a shareholder
vote. Thus, in terms of assessing the cost of imposing a vote,
managers', avoidance behavior indicates that they, at least, believe it
to be costly. Second, by using a unique identification strategy, we find
no evidence that shareholder voting improves either short- or long-
run acquirer performance.
These findings are important as NASDAQ considers revising its
voting requirements. In general, our results are consistent with the
shareholder voting rule adding additional costs, but no discernable
benefits, to acquiring-firm shareholders. The larger implications of
our findings are on the costliness of a shareholder vote outside of
traditional core areas of the shareholder franchise. Our findings
suggest federal regulators should be skeptical of imposing additional
voting requirements on listed firms. Managers will go to great
lengths to avoid a vote, and we find no evidence of any benefit in
Mode of Acquisition in Takeovers: Taxes and Asymmetric Information, 46 J. FIN.
653 (1991); Julian R. Franks, Robert S. Harris & Colin Mayer, Means of Payment
in Takeovers: Results for the United Kingdom and the United States, in
CORPORATE TAKEOVERS: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 221 (Alan J. Auerbach ed.,
1988); Robert G. Hansen, A Theory for the Choice of Exchange Medium in Mergers
and Acquisitions, 60 J. Bus. 75 (1987); Kenneth J. Martin, The Method of
Payment in Corporate Acquisitions, Investment Opportunities, and Management
Ownership, 51 J. FIN. 1227 (1996); Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Stock
Market Driven Acquisitions, 70 J. FIN. ECON. 295 (2003).
33. See, e.g., Office of the Inv'r Advocate Letter, supra note 7.
34. See, e.g., Brown & Ryngaert, supra note 32, at 666; Shleifer & Vishny,
supra note 32, at 296-97.
35. Related but distinct prior literature examines the monitoring role of
institutional investors around acquisitions, generally finding that higher levels
of long-term institutional ownership increase acquirer announcement-window
and long-run returns. See, e.g., Xia Chen et al., Monitoring: Which Institutions
Matter?, 86 J. FIN. ECON. 279, 281 (2007); Jos6-Miguel Gaspar et al., Shareholder
Investment Horizons and the Market for Corporate Control, 76 J. FIN. ECON. 135,
158, 162 (2005).
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extending shareholder voting rights, at least in the acquiring-firm
context. In many ways, we currently operate in the worst of all
regulatory worlds in the acquisition setting: a voting requirement of
unproven benefit that is easily avoided, albeit at the cost of
restructuring what may be the optimal mechanics of a deal. In a
world where votes are costly, they are best used sparingly on matters
that count.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part II first contextualizes the
shareholder vote, explaining how federal law has expanded the
shareholder franchise beyond the traditional contexts required under
state law to areas such as executive compensation. Next, it surveys
the prior literature, which has examined the value of a shareholder
vote on acquisitions. Notably, the United Kingdom imposes a voting
requirement similar in substance to NASDAQ's rule yet much more
difficult to avoid than NASDAQ's. Part II concludes by elucidating
our hypotheses, and Part III moves to test them after describing our
research methodology. Part IV describes the implications of our
study, that our results suggest the costs of expanding the shareholder
franchise to include acquirer votes on acquisitions outweigh any
potential governance benefits.
II. BACKGROUND, PRIOR LITERATURE, AND HYPOTHESES
A. Background
Shareholders have limited rights in the corporation. Typically,
they can vote, sell, and sue.36 Taking the last power first, derivative
suits are a problematic enforcement mechanism. Before suing to
enforce her rights, the shareholder must first engage in a lawsuit
about whether she can sue on behalf of the corporation.37
Alternatively, a disgruntled shareholder may do the "Wall Street
Walk" and sell her shares.38 But if the market agrees with her
unhappiness with management's performance, her right to sell her
shares will likely provide cold comfort, because she will sell at a loss
or at a price that she believes does not reflect the value of a well-
managed firm.39 Thus, the right to vote is an important shareholder
right. State law, which supplies the bulk of corporate law, provides
that shareholders elect directors and vote on major events in the
36. For an overview of shareholder rights, see Julian Velasco, The
Fundamental Rights of the Shareholder, 40 U.C. DAvIS L. REV. 407, 413, 416, 421
(2006).
37. See MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 7.44 (AM. BAR ASS'N 2016).
38. See Amanda M. Rose, Better Bounty Hunting: How the SEC's New
Whistleblower Program Changes the Securities Fraud Class Action Debate, 108
Nw. U. L. REV. 1235, 1256 (2014).
39. Anat R. Admati & Paul Pfleiderer, The 'Wall Street Walk" and
Shareholder Activism: Exit as a Form of Voice, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 2645, 2646
(2009).
2018]
WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW
corporation's life.40 Shareholders must approve before a corporation
can amend its articles of incorporation, sell itself, dispose of all or
substantially all of its assets, or dissolve completely. 41 Notably, in
each case, the board of directors must propose the course of action and
then submit it to a shareholder vote.42 In other words, although the
shareholder vote is necessary, it is not sufficient, nor is it something
the shareholders can directly initiate on their own. In each case, first
the board recommends, and then the shareholders have their say.
Federal law provides additional voting requirements. A recent
example is the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act's advisory say-on-pay vote, which requires that firms
subject their chief executive's pay to a nonbinding advisory vote at
least every three years. 43  This say-on-pay vote has proved
controversial, with critics arguing that it distracts management on a
matter that is not of interest or importance to most shareholders. 44
Votes on proxy proposals, which are shareholder proposals
permitted under federal law,45 are also controversial. SEC Rule 14a-
8 allows shareholders to recommend a course of action for an advisory
shareholder vote.46 If the proposal is allowable, the firm must include
it in its annual proxy materials. 47 Critics argue that these votes
amount to an airing of grievances by little more than corporate
gadflies, but these proposals can consume a significant amount of
managerial time and attention.48 While often failing to gain a
majority vote, these proposals can nonetheless have an effect.4 9
During the three years in which it operated, for example, the
Shareholder Rights Project at Harvard Law School took aim at
corporations with classified boards, those on which directors serve
multiyear terms and thus are not all up for election every year. 0
Critics view classified boards as an example of poor governance
40. Velasco, supra note 36, at 416-18.
41. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 242, 251, 271, 275 (2018); MODEL Bus.
CORP. ACT §§ 10.03, 11.02, 12.02, 14.02.
42. See, e.g., MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT §§ 10.03, 11.02, 12.02, 14.02.
43. 15 U.S.C. § 78n-1 (2012).
44. See Matthew H. Nemeroff, Note, Dodd-Frank: Frankly an Inefficient
Form of Corporate Governance, 23 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 431, 439-40, 443
(2012); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Remarks on Say on Pay: An Unjustified Incursion
on Director Authority 9-10 (UCLA Sch. of Law & Econ. Research Paper Series,
Paper No. 08-06, 2008), https://ssrn.com/abstract=1101688.
45. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2018).
46. See id. § 240.14a-8(m)(1).
47. See id. § 240.14a-8(a).
48. See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 12, at 709; Daniel E. Lazaroff, Promoting
Corporate Democracy and Social Responsibility: The Need to Reform the Federal
Proxy Rules on Shareholder Proposals, 50 RUTGERs L. REV. 33, 90 (1997).
49. See Edelman et al., supra note 1, at 1369; Andrew A. Schwartz, Corporate
Legacy, 5 HARv. Bus. L. REV. 237, 243 (2015).
50. See Matthew D. Cain et al., How Corporate Governance is Made: The
Case of the Golden Leash, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 649, 682 n.151 (2016); Schwartz,
supra note 49.
[Vol. 53
DOES SHAREHOLDER VOTING MATTER?
because they insulate the board from shareholder displeasure,
including by providing protection from the discipline of a hostile
takeover.5 1 The Shareholder Rights Project supported shareholder
proposals that "consistently garnered over 80[%] shareholder
support,"52 leading to 121 Fortune 500 and S&P 500 companies
"moving towards" annual elections. 53
Shareholder voting disciplines directors, and consequently
managers, but is costly. To take the example of shareholder
proposals, according to the law firm Jones Day, "Shareholder
proposals cost U.S. companies tens of millions of dollars each year,
including the costs involved in negotiating with proponents, seeking
SEC no-action relief to exclude proposals from proxy statements, and
in preparing opposition statements."54 Each vote imposes uncertainty
and delay on corporate actions and transactions. 55 A collective action
problem exists when each shareholder must separately bear the cost
of informing themselves but can free ride on the efforts of others. 56 As
Edelman et al. point out, intermediaries such as mutual funds and
hedge funds now mitigate this collective action problem, but they also
introduce costs of their own, most notably conflicts of interest.5 7
Starting in the 1920s, the exchanges began imposing their own
voting requirements on listed companies, in addition to state and
federal law. Beginning in 1926, NYSE began enforcing a form of
shareholder voting rights by refusing to list the common stock of
companies that did not have voting rights associated with their
stock.58  In 1955, NYSE revisited the shareholder voting
51. See Alma Cohen & Charles C.Y. Wang, How Do Staggered Boards Affect
Shareholder Value? Evidence from a Natural Experiment, 110 J. FIN. ECON. 627,
628 (2013).
52. See Edelman et al., supra note 1, at 1369.
53. Whether or not the Shareholder Rights Project benefited shareholders is
currently subject to debate in the finance literature. See Lucian Bebchuk & Alma
Cohen, Recent Board Declassifications: A Response to Cremers and Sepe 1 (May
18, 2017) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2970629; Martijn
Cremers & Simone Sepe, Board Declassification Activism: The Financial Value
of the Shareholder Rights Project 2-3 (June 21, 2017) (unpublished manuscript),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2962162.
54. LIZANNE THOMAS ET AL., JONES DAY, SHAREHOLDER PROPOSALS: RENEWED
CALLS FOR REFORM 1 (2014), http://www.jonesday.com/files/Publication/3a9acf07
-6e lc-44f6-ad58-45f3bdb99350/Presentation/PublicationAttachment6550df92
-062c-45a7-aOOd-52bdcc828de7/Shareholder%20Proposals%20Renewed.pdf.
55. See generally Vineet Bhagwat et al., The Real Effects of Uncertainty on
Merger Activity, 29 REV. FIN. STUD. 3000 (2016); Audra L. Boone et al.,
Shareholder Decision Rights in Acquisitions: Evidence from Tender Offers (Ind.
Legal Stud. Res. Paper No. 331, 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2629424.
56. Edelman et al., supra note 1, at 1379.
57. Id. at 1379, 1401-06.
58. GEORGE L. LEFFLER, THE STOCK MARKET 454 (2d ed. 1957). This policy
was in response to the view that companies listed on the exchange could
manipulate or take advantage of shareholders through the use of nonvoting
shares. Id.
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requirements and adopted the current rule for acquisitions, requiring
shareholder approval if more than 20% of an acquirer's outstanding
shares were issued in an acquisition.59 Michael points out that in
addition to the desire for shareholder oversight in corporate matters
to mitigate agency conflict, shareholder voting policies established by
NYSE in the 1920s and the 1950s were a response to competition for
business (i.e., listings).60 NYSE hoped that strengthening its listing
standards would attract additional investors (and therefore listings)
by providing investors with greater shareholder protections. 61 AMEX
was slower to adopt standards related to shareholder voting. In 1946,
AMEX adopted a general shareholder voting policy largely similar to
that adopted by NYSE in 1926 but allowing for the listing of
nonvoting shares on a case-by-case basis. 62 On November 16, 1982,
AMEX adopted a 20% rule similar to NYSE's rule for issuances of
stock used for the purposes of making an acquisition, thus providing
uniformity with the NYSE rules. 63
In contrast, NASDAQ was slower to move to protect acquiring
shareholders with a vote. On August 5, 1988, NASDAQ proposed
current Rule 5635,64 covering shareholder voting on stock issuances
in connection with an acquisition, which the SEC approved on
January 9, 1989.65 The rule required shareholder approval if newly
issued shares in an acquisition amounted to 25% or more of the
acquirer's stock;6 6 there was previously no such rule at NASDAQ.67
On September 18, 1989, NASDAQ proposed a stricter threshold of
20%, which the SEC approved on July 19, 1990.68 Note, however, that
59. Michael, supra note 29, at 1469.
60. Id. at 1477 n.106.
61. Id. at 1470-72.
62. Id. at 1472. In fact, AMEX used this flexibility to compete with NYSE
for business, consistent with the reasons suggested for many of the listing
standards developed over time. For example, in 1976, Wang Laboratories, Inc.,
sought to be listed on NYSE. Joel Seligman, Equal Protection in Shareholder
Voting Rights: The One Common Share, One Vote Controversy, 54 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 687, 704-05 (1986). Because Wang had dual-class stock with different
voting rights, NYSE denied their request for listing. Id. Wang then went to
AMEX, which listed the company. Id. This was one of the first visible instances
of competition among the exchanges based on shareholder voting rights. Id.
63. Order Approving Proposed Rule Change, 47 Fed. Reg. 53,541 (Nov. 26,
1982).
64. Notice of Filing and Immediate Effectiveness of Proposed Rule Change
Relating to Revisions and Restructuring of the NASDAQ Listing Rules, 74 Fed.
Reg. 15,552, 15,558 (Apr. 6, 2009) (approving the revision of what was previously
Rule 4350).
65. Order Approving Proposed Rule Change Relating to Eligibility Criteria
for NASDAQ National Market System Securities, 54 Fed. Reg. 1463, 1463-65
(Jan. 13, 1989).
66. Id. at 1464 n.5.
67. Id. at 1464.
68. Order Approving Proposed Rule Change Relating to Shareholder
Approval of Certain Transactions for NASDAQ National Market System Issuers,
55 Fed. Reg. 30,346 (July 25, 1990); Press Release, NASDAQ, supra note 5; Jeff
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the voting rules are not as stringent as they might at first blush
appear because of quorum and voting requirements. NASDAQ, like
NYSE, requires a positive vote of 50% of the votes cast (provided a
quorum exists69), not of the total outstanding shares. 70 Therefore, if
the shareholder electorate is relatively apathetic and chooses not to
vote, a relatively small proportion of shareholders could allow an
acquirer to proceed with the issuance of a substantial number of
shares. 71
NASDAQ initially enacted the shareholder voting rule to provide
shareholders with a greater level of both participation in corporate
affairs and protection. 72 The change also made NASDAQ's rules
substantially equivalent to the rules of the other major exchanges. 73
NASDAQ viewed the increase in listing requirements surrounding
shareholder voting as a way to enhance its similarities with NYSE
and AMEX exchanges and provide a stronger case for gaining "blue
sky" law exemptions that NYSE and AMEX listings already
enjoyed.74 Now the question of whether an acquiring-shareholder
vote is worth the cost is back on the table.
Zalesin, NASDAQ Mulls Update to Shareholder Approval Rules, LAw360 (Nov.
18, 2015, 7:49 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/728909. In order to reduce
noise during the interim period between the initial 25% threshold and the final
20% threshold, this Article specifies the main analysis to treat the pre-rule-
change period as the thirty-six months before the 25% rule and the post-rule-
change period as the thirty-six months after the 20% rule change. This Article
also separately analyzes the 25% and 20% thresholds individually in Part III.F
and finds results consistent with our main analysis.
69. NASDAQ, STOCK MARKET RULES r. 5620(c) (2018),
http://nasdaq.cchwallstreet.com/NASDAQTools/bookmark.asp?id=nasdaq-rule
_5620&manual=/nasdaq/mainlnasdaq-equityrules/ ("Each Company that is not a
limited partnership shall provide for a quorum as specified in its by-laws for any
meeting of the holders of common stock; provided, however, that in no case shall
such quorum be less than 33 1/3 % of the outstanding shares of the Company's
common voting stock.").
70. Id. r. 5635(e)(4) (2018), http://nasdaq.cchwallstreet.com/NASDAQTools
/bookmark.asp?id=nasdaq-rule_5635&manual=/nasdaq/main/nasdaq
-equityrules/.
71. Kastiel and Nili investigated the total percentage of shares that were not
voted in each of the matters standing for a vote at S&P 500 companies in 2008-
2015 and found that the percentage of shares that did not vote increased from
15.2% in 2008 to 21.7% in 2015. Kobi Kastiel & Yaron Nili, In Search of the
'Absent" Shareholders: A New Solution to Retail Investors' Apathy, 41 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 55, 61 (2016).
72. Order Approving Proposed Rule Change Relating to Eligibility Criteria
for NASDAQ National Market System Securities, 54 Fed. Reg. 1463, 1464 (Jan.
13, 1989) (explaining that NASDAQ proposed the rule to provide shareholders
with "a greater level of participation in corporate affairs" and "provide further
shareholder protection commensurate with the stature" of its issuers).
73. Id. at 1464.
74. Seligman, supra note 62, at 705-07. Blue sky laws refer to state-level
regulations regarding securities issuances. Blue-Sky Law, BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). Each state has their own agency that regulates
security listings and offerings. However, to avoid duplication with federal
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We study NASDAQ's 1989 shareholder voting rule change
because it provides a clean setting for identification of the impact of
shareholder voting requirements. Using the NASDAQ rule change
allows us to isolate a change in shareholder voting requirements as
compared to NYSE and AMEX, whose rules remained unchanged.
7 5
B. Prior Literature and Hypothesis Development
1. Benefits of Shareholder Voting
As Subpart I.A described, shareholder voting rights were
established to provide investor oversight over corporate managers to
mitigate agency costs. 76 The literature has not examined the effect of
shareholder voting rules enacted by stock exchanges; in fact, existing
acquisitions research typically does not even consider whether stock
issuances face shareholder approval. Taking into account
shareholder voting could change the conclusions of a study given that,
in many transactions typical in acquisition studies, acquiring-firm
shareholders effectively have approval rights over the merger.
7 7 Of
the few papers that look at the stock exchange rules for shareholder
approval of equity issuances, the five most closely related to our study
agencies, such as the SEC, securities listed on national exchanges (i.e., NYSE
and AMEX, but not NASDAQ during our sample period) are exempt from such
state laws. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 73-207 (2018).
75. Data limitations prevent studying the NYSE and AMEX changes
themselves. The shareholder voting threshold at both NYSE and AMEX during
our sample period was 20%. Michael, supra note 29, at 1497 n.223.
76. See supra Subpart II.A.
77. See e.g., Clifford G. Holderness, Equity Issuances and Agency Costs: The
Telling Story of Shareholder Approval around the World 2 n.3 (Sept. 2015)
(unpublished manuscript), http://www.pitt.edu/~awkochlC%20Holderness%20
-%20Shareholder%2OVoting%20and%20Internet%20Appendix%20September
%202015.pdf ("Chang (1998) is one of many papers that do not appear to
recognize the requirement of shareholder approval of equity issuances but where
such approval is central to the question at hand. [He finds acquirers using stock]
often experience a positive announcement return. [However, stock issuance] is
usually conditional on shareholder approval. In these cases, by approving the
stock issuance, the bidding firm's shareholders are effectively approving the
merger. Chang does not consider this possibility. (I assume because he is
unaware of it.) Thus, he does not divide his sample into those mergers that were
approved by the bidding firms' shareholders and those that were not. This
obviously could be relevant for explaining the positive overall announcement
returns for bidders that he finds.... The same point can be made of virtually all
studies of acquisitions by United States exchange-listed firms where the method
of payment is relevant .... As we shall see, this insight recasts some of their
conclusions.!).
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are Becht et al.,78 Li et al.,79 Kang and Park,80 Chan and Brown,8 1 and
Holderness,8 2 but none examine the NASDAQ rule change or its
implications.
Two of these recent papers are closely related to this Article.
First, the working paper by Li et al. investigates the effect of
shareholder voting rules on acquirer returns at a time when all U.S.
stock exchanges share the same voting rules.8 3 However, this paper
faces an empirical challenge; it assumes that firms cannot opt out of
an all-stock deal that would necessitate a vote. Yet U.S. stock
exchange rules largely provide managers with discretion in
determining which deals are subject to a shareholder vote,8 4 enabling
managers to select only relatively better deals to undergo a vote.
Li et al. compare deals subject to a vote with those not subject to
a vote using two methodologies.8 5 First, they examine all-stock deals
in which the acquirer issues a number of shares just below the voting
threshold and just above the voting threshold.8 6 Li et al. find higher
announcement returns and post-acquisition performance for all-stock
acquirers above the shareholder voting threshold.87 They find this
result holds only in the sample of acquiring firms with high
institutional ownership.88 As a second test, they compare all-stock
deals subject to a vote to mixed-payment deals that are not subject to
a vote and similarly find that voting deals earn higher returns.8 9
These results would seem to suggest that imposing an acquirer vote
benefits shareholders.
78. Marco Becht et al., Does Mandatory Shareholder Voting Prevent Bad
Acquisitions?, 29 REV. FIN. STUD. 3035 (2016).
79. Kai Li et al., Vote Avoidance and Shareholder Voting in Mergers and
Acquisitions (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Fin. Working Paper No. 481/2016,
2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2801580.
80. Jun-Koo Kang & James Park, Equity Issuance, Distress, and Agency
Problems: The 20% Rule for Privately Issued Equity (Dec. 14, 2017) (unpublished
manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2139507.
81. Howard W. Chan & Rob Brown, Rights Issues Versus Placements in
Australia: Regulation or Choice?, 22 COMPANY & SEC. L.J. 301, 304-10 (2004).
82. Holderness, supra note 77.
83. See Li et al., supra note 79, at 1.
84. Davidoff Solomon, supra note 23.
85. Li et al., supra note 79, at 1.
86. Id. at 2.
87. Id. at 3.
88. Id. In similar studies, Hsieh and Wang find that deals subject to a vote
are less likely to be completed but find mixed evidence on performance, while
Kamar finds no evidence that acquisitions subject to a vote experience better
performance. See Jim Hsieh & Qinghai Wang, Shareholder Voting Rights in
Mergers and Acquisitions 3 (Mar. 2008), http://wwwl.american.edu/academic
.depts/ksb/finance realestate/rhauswald/seminar/voteAmerican.pdf; see also
Ehud Kamar, Does Shareholder Voting on Acquisitions Matter? 3 (Mar. 2011)
(unpublished manuscript), http://www7.tau.ac.il/blogs/law/wp-content/uploads
/2011/11/March-2011.pdf. Kamar also finds that the voting rules increase the
amount of time required to complete an acquisition. Id.
89. Li et al., supra note 79, at 2.
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However, Li et al. make a particularly strong assumption. They
assume that an acquirer in an all-stock deal can only choose an all-
stock deal. 90 If there is no choice between deal structures, then deals
around the voting threshold should be relatively similar except that
deals just surpassing the threshold are subject to a vote. Under this
assumption, the number of shares issued in the deal is based on the
value of the deal and not subject to managerial discretion (i.e., similar
to the setting Becht et al.9 1 examine, discussed below). 92 Crucially,
however, Li et al.'s assumption does not hold in practice. Acquirers
in the United States can choose whether or not to engage in an all-
stock deal by electing to substitute cash for a portion of the stock.93
This means that managers can self-select into all-stock deals above or
below the voting threshold. 94 Given this ability to self-select, we
would expect that only when managers are confident in the merits of
a deal would they subject it to a shareholder vote and that these deals
should generate relatively higher returns.
As expected, Li et al. find that deals subject to voting experience
higher announcement returns than those that skirt the voting
threshold.95 As noted, a limitation of their test is that all of the firms
in their sample are subject to the same voting requirements. 96 In
contrast, our novel setting allows us to use an exogenous regulatory
change as identification, taking advantage of periods of
heterogeneous voting requirements, in order to provide additional
insight on the effects of shareholder voting. Our study thus examines
a situation where the baseline requires a vote, but the vote may be
avoided, and asks whether the vote in such circumstances is
beneficial.
90. Id. at 3.
91. Becht et al., supra note 78, at 3037 (citing Jim Hsieh & Qinghai Wang,
Shareholder Voting Rights in Mergers and Acquisitions (Mar. 2008) (unpublished
manuscript), http://wwwl.american.edu/academic.depts/ksb/financerealestate
/rhauswald/seminar/voteAmerican.pdf).
92. See infra notes 97-106 and accompanying text.
93. N.Y. STOCK EXCH., LISTED COMPANY MANUAL §§ 312.03-.05 (2018),
http://wallstreet.cch.com/LCMToolsPlatformViewer.asp?selectednode=chp%5F1
%5F4%5F12%5F3&manual=%2Flcm%2Fsections%2Flcm%2Dsections%2F; N.Y.
STOCK EXCH., NYSE AMERICAN COMPANY GUIDE § 712 (2018),
http://wallstreet.cch.com/AmericanTools/bookmark.asp?id=sx-policymanual
-amex-acgSHAREHOLDERSAPPROVAL710713&manual=/American




94. NASDAQ, STOCKMARKET RULES r. 5635, http://nasdaq.cchwallstreet.com
/NASDAQTools/PlatformViewer.asp?selectednode=chp% 5Fl%5F1% 5F4% 5F3
%5F8%5F24&manual=%2Fnasdaq%2Fmain%2Fnasdaq%2Dequityrules%2F
(requiring shareholder approval only where common stock issuance exceeds a
20% voting threshold).
95. Li et al., supra note 79, at 3.
96. Id.
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The other important recent study related to this Article, Becht et
al., focuses on a very different regulatory regime, that of the United
Kingdom.9 7 In the U.K., shareholder voting is generally mandatory
for acquisitions meeting certain thresholds.98 The U.K. voting
threshold is based on the total deal size rather than the percentage of
shares issued.9 9 Specifically, for U.K. acquirers there are several
thresholds that relate either to the amount paid in the deal or to
accounting values on prior periods' reports. 100 Triggering any of the
thresholds imposes mandatory shareholder voting.101 Because the
thresholds are based on total acquisition size, rather than method of
payment, managers have almost no discretion around meeting or
missing the shareholder voting threshold.10 2 Instead, it is the size of
the target that determines whether a vote will occur.103 These
mandatory thresholds provide a strong setting for Becht et al. to
identify the effects of shareholder voting requirements as it is difficult
for a manager to alter deal size just to avoid a shareholder vote and
impossible to change prior periods' accounting results. In other
words, the U.K.'s rules cannot be easily avoided, in contrast to the
NASDAQ regulations.
Becht et al. find that deals above the voting threshold have
higher acquirer announcement returns.1 04  They conclude that
shareholder voting requirements impose a binding and credible
constraint on acquirers so that only good deals are pursued if voting
is required. 105 In contrast to the backdrop of their paper, the setting
in this Article allows the examination of the influence of shareholder
voting on payment method, in a context where managers have the
ability to use discretion when selecting the payment method to avoid
shareholder voting. Said differently, in the U.K., a vote is a binding
and credible constraint. 106 The fact that NASDAQ introduced a rule
that can be avoided with relative ease allows us to test the extent to
which managers are willing to avoid the rule and the market's
reaction to that avoidance.
Studies outside the acquisition context also examine managers'
use of discretion regarding shareholder voting thresholds. Kang and
97. Becht et al., supra note 78, at 3037.
98. FIN. CONDUCT AuTH., LISTING RULEs r. 10.5.1, (2018),
https://www.handbook.fca.org.uk/handbook/LRl0.pdf.
99. Id. § 10.2.1.
100. Id.
101. Id. § 10.5.1.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Becht et al., supra note 78, at 3038.
105. Burch, Morgan, and Wolf, among others, find that acquiring-shareholder
voting is a credible threat against acquirers' ability to complete acquisitions. See
generally Timothy R. Burch, Angela G. Morgan & Jack G. Wolf, Is Acquiring-
Firm Shareholder Approval in Stock-for-Stock Mergers Perfunctory?, 33 FIN.
MGMT. 45 (2004).
106. Becht et al., supra note 78, at 3037.
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Park examine discounted private placements and find discontinuity
around the 20% equity issuance threshold.107 Firms avoiding the
shareholder voting threshold issue at higher discounts and have both
lower announcement returns and decreasing profitability in the
following two years.108 However, this study's subject matter provides
a notable limitation on generalizing from its findings: discounted
private placements involve issuing securities at below-market prices,
usually by distressed firms in need of a quick financing solution.109
While somewhat related, these transactions are substantially
different than issuing securities for an acquisition.
Chan and Brown 110 likewise focus on private placements and
examine a law change in Australia. That country increased the
shareholder voting threshold on private placements from requiring a
vote for placements exceeding 10% of existing shares to requiring a
vote on placements exceeding 15% of existing shares.111 Chan and
Brown find that firms issue an amount of equity in private
placements that falls just below the threshold (10% at first, and 15%
following the rule change) requiring shareholder approval. 11 2
Holdernessi 13 analyzes the benefits of shareholder voting using
all equity issuances in a cross-country setting. Holderness compiles
results of existing studies for a given equity issuance method and
country (i.e., seasoned equity offerings, rights offerings, and private
placements), similar to a meta-analysis. 114 He finds that equity
issuances subject to shareholder approval have positive
announcement returns on average, arguing that shareholder
approval reduces agency costs. 1 5 We complement and extend the
analysis of Holderness using a strong identification setting to study
the effects of shareholder voting in U.S. acquisitions. Further, as
suggested by Holderness, 116 we investigate whether shareholder
voting requirements are an important, previously unexplored factor
in determining the method of payment in acquisitions.
2. Costs of Shareholder Voting
While these studies generally focus on identifying the benefits
associated with shareholder voting, in the form of better short- and
long-run acquisition performance, the costs associated with
shareholder voting are less well defined. Agency theory suggests that
acquiring-firm managers may desire to avoid shareholder approval to
107. Kang & Park, supra note 80, at 9.
108. Id. at 4.
109. Id. at 10-11.
110. Chan & Brown, supra note 81.
111. Id. at 304.
112. Id. at 308.
113. See generally Holderness, supra note 77.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 22-23.
116. Id. at 8.
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forgo shareholder oversight, especially if managers anticipate
shareholder dissension. 117  In addition to costs associated with
avoiding shareholder oversight, allowing a deal to go to a shareholder
vote could also be administratively costly and time intensive,
potentially increasing the likelihood of deal failure.11s This Article
assumes that, absent shareholder voting rules, managers will use the
most appropriate deal structure to complete the deal (regardless of
the appropriateness of the deal).
The introduction discussed how Time changed its deal structure
to avoid a shareholder vote in its acquisition of Warner. Kraft Foods's
acquisition of Cadbury is an even clearer example of structuring a
transaction with the sole purpose of avoiding shareholder voting. 119
In September 2009, Kraft's management disclosed plans to launch an
unsolicited tender offer for Cadbury. 120 The initial offer allowed for
the use of up to 370 million shares (25%) of Kraft's stock and £4.3 ($7)
billion in cash as a means to purchase Cadbury for a total purchase
price of about $16.5 billion. 121 Warren Buffet, a significant investor
in Kraft, openly opposed the merger. 122 His opposition, along with the
opposition of the Cadbury board, led to a restructuring of the deal that
both sweetened its total value (to $19.6 billion) and provided a means
of avoiding a shareholder vote.1 23 Kraft's management restructured
the means of payment in the offer terms from 25% to 18% of Kraft's
stock, which drastically increased the amount of cash-financed with
debt-in the offer and pushed the deal just below the 20% shareholder
voting threshold. 124 Thus, Kraft was able to avoid a shareholder vote
117. John Armor et al., Agency Problems and Legal Strategies, in THE
ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 29, 29-
31 (3d ed. 2017).
118. STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS (3d ed. 2012). We
also note that managers may seek to avoid shareholder voting because they
believe that their expertise and private information allows them to make superior
decisions relative to shareholders. Li et al., supra note 79, at 14.
119. Davidoff Solomon, supra note 23.
120. TIMELINE-Kraft Agrees Cadbury Deal After 4-month Fight, REUTERS
(Jan. 19, 2010, 8:27 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/cadbury-kraft
-idUSLDE60EOXI20100119.
121. Kraft Foods, Inc., Definitive Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A) (Dec. 18,
2009), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/datal 103982/000119312509255952
/ddefml4a.htm; Jane Wardell & Robert Barr, Kraft Foods, Cadbury Agree $19.5
Bln Deal, BoSTON.COM (Jan. 5, 2010), http://archive.boston.com/business/articles
/2010/01/19/kraftfoods cadbury_neartoagreed deal/.
122. Colin Barr, Buffett Votes against Kraft Bid for Cadbury, FORTUNE, (Jan.
5, 2010, 10:27 AM), http://archive.fortune.com/2010/01/05/news/companies/kraft
.cadbury.fortune/index.htm.
123. David Jones & Brad Dorfman, Kraft Snares Cadbury for $ 19.6 Billion,
REUTERS (Jan. 19, 2010, 7:02 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-cadbury
-idUSTRE60H 1N020100119.
124. Id.; Davidoff Solomon, supra note 23.
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on acquiring Cadbury, at the cost of substantially increasing the
firm's debt.125
Because of the anecdotal evidence showing that some managers
incur costs to avoid shareholder voting, empirically analyzing the
method of payment in acquisitions provides a first step in
documenting how shareholder approval in acquisitions creates
additional costs. We note that, despite these potential costs, potential
benefits of shareholder voting arise when voting prevents managers
from completing value-destroying acquisitions. Consistent with prior
research, we measure the benefits using short- and long-run
performance measures.
Thus, we extend the existing literature, evaluating both the costs
and benefits of shareholder approval in acquisitions, by proposing and
examining the following two hypotheses:
Hypothesis One ("Hi"): After NASDAQ enacts rules
requiring shareholder approval of stock acquisitions that use
more than a certain percentage of an acquirer's shares,
NASDAQ acquirers are less likely to issue a number of
shares that triggers shareholder voting.
Hypothesis Two ("H2"): Acquirers subject to shareholder
voting requirements make better acquisition decisions,
resulting in better acquisition performance.
Despite some related evidence in prior literature, these
predictions may not hold. First, as noted above, Hsieh and Wang,126
Kamar,127 and Li et al. 128 find mixed or conflicting evidence on
whether voting rights lead to better acquisitions. In the prior
literature on private placements, distressed firns issuing equity in
discounted private placements likely have agency problems, 129 which
do not necessarily mirror issues facing acquiring firms. In fact,
several commentators suggest that shareholder voting requirements
in acquisitions unnecessarily burden acquiring firms, without
providing benefits. 130  Finally, some literature argues that
shareholders sometimes favor low-quality acquisitions, suggesting
that shareholder voting may not have a positive impact on acquisition
performance outcomes. 131
125. Davidoff Solomon, supra note 23.
126. Hsieh & Wang, supra note 88.
127. Kamar, supra note 88.
128. Li et al., supra note 79.
129. Kooyul Jung et al., Timing, Investment Opportunities, Managerial
Discretion, and the Security Issue Decision, 42 J. FIN. ECON. 159, 160 (1996).
130. E.g., Michael, supra note 29, at 1490; Zalesin, supra note 68.
131. Gregor Matvos & Michael Ostrovsky, Cross-Ownership, Returns, and
Voting in Mergers, 89 J. FIN. ECON. 391, 391 (2008); Eitan Goldman & Wenyu
Wang, Weak Governance by Informed Large Shareholders 2 (Eur. Corp.
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III. RESEARCH METHOD AND RESULTS
The analysis in this Article begins by obtaining all merger and
acquisition data from January 10, 1986 (thirty-six months before the
25% rule was enacted), through July 18, 1993 (thirty-six months after
the 20% rule became effective), from Thomson Reuters's SDC
Platinum database ("SDC"). 132 Acquisitions during the transition
from the 25% rule to the 20% rule-i.e., from January 10, 1989, to
July 18, 1990-have been excluded. Excluding this transition period
helps clearly identify how the new shareholder voting requirements
affect acquisitions without confounding effects of proposals and
discussions of future rule changes that existed during this period.
Therefore, the sample contains all acquisitions with an effective date
between January 10, 1986, and January 10, 1989, and all acquisitions
that were announced after July 18, 1990, but before July 18, 1993.
The sample of acquisitions has been restricted to include only
those deals that have nonmissing announcement and effective (or
withdrawn, for withdrawn deals) dates and where the acquirer has
nonmissing price data available in the Center for Research in
Security Prices. This Article further restricts the sample to include
only deals with available deal value and method-of-payment
information. To clearly identify the effect of shareholder voting on
acquisitions, the sample has been restricted to include only those
deals where the deal value exceeds 20% of the acquirer's value one
day prior to the acquisition announcement date; deals not meeting
this restriction could not involve 20% or more of the acquirer's stock.
To determine whether an acquirer would be subject to the
shareholder voting requirements, this Article first determines the
number of shares expected to be issued in an acquisition. Using SDC,
the percentage of stock used in the acquisition is multiplied by the
total consideration to determine the value of stock used in the
acquisition. The stock value is then divided by the acquirer's share
price the day before the announcement date to determine the number
of shares expected to be issued upon completion of the acquisition.
This provides the numerator for the shareholder voting threshold
calculation. Next, the percentage of an acquirer's outstanding stock
expected to be issued in connection with an acquisition is calculated
by dividing the shares expected to be issued by the total number of
Governance Inst., Fin. Working Paper No. 469/2016, 2017), https:/Hssrn.com
/abstract=2768328.
132. One innovation of Li et al., supra note 79, is the hand collection of share
issuance figures from SEC filings. Because the earliest filings in the SEC's
EDGAR system date to 1993, with coverage largely complete only in 1995, it was
impossible to access similar data during the sample period. As such, the share
issuance data is noisy to the extent SDC data would not match hand-collected
data. It would be expected that any noise increases standard errors and biases
against us finding significant results.
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shares outstanding the day before the acquisition is announced. 133 If
the result exceeds the shareholder voting threshold (20%), the
acquisition is classified as subject to shareholder voting requirements
and identified as "20% equity issuance deals."
What follows is a brief explanation of the methodology used for
testing this Article's hypotheses.
Hi: After the NASDAQ enacts rules requiring shareholder
approval of stock acquisitions that use more than a certain
percentage of an acquirer's shares, NASDAQ acquirers are
less likely to issue a number of shares that triggers
shareholder voting.
The difference-in-difference methodology allows the testing of
whether acquiring firms are less likely to structure the transaction
using enough stock such that they meet the shareholder voting
requirement (our H1) following the rule change. This Article focuses
on the difference in deals that require a shareholder vote for acquirers
listed on NASDAQ versus other exchanges across the periods before
and after the rule change.134  Several additional variables are
included, as in Ayers, Lefanowicz, and Robinson, 135 to control for
factors that influence acquisition activity and deal structure. The
dependent variable, VOTE, is one in acquisitions in which the
acquirer would be subject to a shareholder vote as a result of issuing
more than 20% of its outstanding shares (i.e., 20% equity issuance
deals) and is zero otherwise. The following logistic model is
estimated:
MODEL 1
VOTEi,t = Bo + BIPOST*NASDAQi,t + 62NASDAQi,t + B3POSTi,t
+ 64CONTROLSi,t + e
POST is equal to one in the period after NASDAQ enacted its
final 20% threshold rule and is zero otherwise. NASDAQ is equal to
one for acquirers listed on NASDAQ and is zero otherwise. Controls
include firm, deal, and economy characteristics associated with the
method of payment. 13 6 These control variables are detailed in the
Appendix. Based on H1, this Article predicts a negative coefficient on
8i.
133. As noted in Li et al., supra note 79, the voting threshold is based on the
number of shares the acquirer expects to issue, which the acquirer determines
prior to the acquisition announcement date.
134. As a supplemental analysis, we also examine both of our hypotheses in
the pre-rule-change period only. This allows us to perform simple comparisons
of NASDAQ acquisitions, with no shareholder voting rules, to those of the other
exchanges that imposed shareholder voting requirements. See infra Subpart
III.A.
135. See generally Ayers, Lefanowicz & Robinson, supra note 32.
136. Id. at 320.
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A. Descriptive Statistics and Results for the Period Prior to the
NASDAQ Rule Change
To understand the effects of shareholder voting on method of
payment and subsequent performance, we first analyze deals prior to
the NASDAQ rule change. This analysis allows for the comparison of
deals on NASDAQ, which had no shareholder voting requirements, to
deals on other exchanges, which had voting requirements. We use
the period from November 16, 1982, the date AMEX implemented its
shareholder voting rule, through NASDAQ's initial rule
implementation on January 9, 1989.137
Table 1, Panel A presents descriptive statistics for deals before
the NASDAQ rule change, split between acquisitions on NASDAQ
and those on other exchanges. 138 The results show that, prior to the
NASDAQ rule change, NASDAQ firms were significantly more likely
to issue a number of shares that exceeded the voting threshold of
other exchanges. The magnitude of the difference is economically
significant, with the proportion of 20% equity issuance deals by
NASDAQ acquirers being more than twice as large as the proportion
of 20% equity issuance deals by acquirers on other exchanges (22.4%
versus 9.0%). This evidence is consistent with shareholder voting
rules enticing managers to change the structure of acquisitions to
avoid a vote, which is consistent with H1. However, these results are
univariate and descriptive only; this Article's main inferences are left
to the difference-in-difference tests in Subpart III.C.
137. See supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
138. See infra Table 1.
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TABLE 1: DESCRIPTI'VE STATISTICS-PRE-NASDAQ RULE CHANGE 139
Panel A. Full Sample
NASDAQ Other Exchanges Difference
Variable N Mean SD N Mean SD Diff. p-value
VOTE 303 0.224 0.418 669 0.090 0.286 0.135** (0.000)
CAR 301 0.018 0.081 666 0.016 0.075 0.00198 (0.711)
MTB 271 1.183 1.076 628 1.069 2.708 0.114 (0.501)
INTRISK 303 0.021 0.003 669 0.022 0.003 -0.000344 (0.137)
AAA 303 0.106 0.014 669 0.107 0.015 -0.00123 (0.214)
GNP 303 5.520 0.377 669 5.449 0.362 0.0702*** (0.006)
INDSHK 303 0.216 0.298 669 0.283 1.744 -0.0677 (0.502)
CHG CASH 303 7.924 60.683 669 5.179 50.023 2.745 (0.459)
STINTILTINT 303 0.841 0.033 669 0.843 0.032 -0.00115 (0.608)
REL SIZE 270 0.817 1.644 628 7.254 158.261 -6.437 (0.504)
SERIAL 303 0.059 0.237 669 0.045 0.207 0.0146 (0.332)
TIME 303 3.670 2.114 669 3.776 1.883 -0.106 (0.434)
PUBLIC 303 0.383 0.487 669 0.426 0.495 -0.0432 (0.206)
LN MARKET 270 4.401 1.338 628 5.110 1.569 -0.709*** (0.000)
ROA 270 0.028 0.110 627 0.027 0.232 0.00158 (0.915)
Panel B: Only Deals Where the Acquirer Issues More than 20% of Its
Outstanding Shares
NASDAQ Other Exchanges Difference
Variable N Mean SD N Mean SD Diff. p-value
CAR 67 0.013 0.084 59 (0.008) 0.062 0.0205 (0.128)
MTB 57 1.189 1.132 51 1.128 0.841 0.0603 (0.756)
INTRISK 68 0.022 0.003 60 0.023 0.003 -0.000444 (0.412)
AAA 68 0.098 0.008 60 0.100 0.010 -0.00227 (0.168)
GNP 68 5.706 0.236 60 5.598 0.230 0.108** (0.010)
INDSHK 68 0.212 0.232 60 0.354 0.823 -0.142 (0.175)
CHG CASH 68 34.873 124.897 60 38.881 132.570 -4.009 (0.861)
STINTILTINT 68 0.834 0.028 60 0.825 0.028 0.00858* (0.089)
REL SIZE 57 0.397 0.305 51 0.518 0.607 -0.121 (0.185)
SERIAL 68 0.118 0.325 60 0.050 0.220 0.0676 (0.176)
TIME 68 4.419 1.591 60 4.332 1.413 0.0867 (0.746)
PUBLIC 68 0.662 0.477 60 0.833 0.376 -0.172** (0.027)
LN MARKET 57 5.165 1.435 51 5.952 1.426 -0.787*** (0.005)
ROA 57 0.005 0.160 51 0.043 0.066 -0.0374 (0.123)
139. This table presents summary statistics with univariate results
comparing average firm, deal, and macroeconomic factors of NASDAQ versus
other exchanges before the NASDAQ rule change. ***, **, * indicate significant
differences in means of each variable across exchanges at the 1%, 5%, and 10%,
respectively. For definitions of variables, see infra Appendix.
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Table 1, Panel B presents statistics for only the subset of deals
that would exceed the threshold for shareholder voting.140 That is,
Panel B examines only deals where the acquirer issues more than
20% of its outstanding shares in connection with the acquisition.141
In this setting, there is no support for H2, as the announcement
returns do not differ across exchanges. In other words, the
shareholder vote required on the "other" exchanges does not appear
to increase acquirer announcement returns. Also, there seems to be
no statistically significant difference in the time required to complete
deals between those requiring a vote and those not requiring a vote,
which suggests that voting does not cost the acquiring firm by
imposing additional delay. As in Panel A, these results are only
univariate and should thus be interpreted with caution.
Table 2 confirms the results from the univariate statistics in
Table 1 in a multivariate setting. 142 Table 2, Panel A presents the
results from a logit regression of the likelihood that an acquirer issues
more than 20% of its shares in an acquisition. 143 The regression is
identical to Model 1, excluding the difference-in-difference (POST)
variable. Consistent with Table 1, Panel A, NASDAQ acquirers are
significantly more likely to issue more than 20% of their outstanding
shares in an acquisition than are firms listed on NYSE or AMEX.
Because, in this partition of the sample, NASDAQ firms are not
subject to shareholder voting rules, the result is consistent with
shareholder voting rules on other exchanges deterring the issuance of
shares. Viewed differently, this result is consistent with acquiring
firms choosing to list on NASDAQ due to their relatively unrestricted
ability to use stock as an acquisition currency. Both explanations are
consistent with firms taking advantage of NASDAQ's weak listing
requirements. H1, formally tested in Subpart III.C, examines
whether voting requirements constrain this behavior.
Table 1, Panel B presents the results from an announcement
return regression comparing the difference in announcement returns
between NASDAQ and NYSE or AMEX acquirers using greater than
20% of equity as consideration. 144 H2 (discussed and tested in more
detail in Subpart III.C) suggests that, if shareholder voting in the
context of acquisitions is value enhancing, then NASDAQ acquirers
whose deals would be subject to a vote on other exchanges
(NASDAQ*VOTE) should have a lower return than those on other
exchanges due to the absence of the voting requirement. Consistent
with Table 1, Panel B, there is no evidence that these NASDAQ firms
have lower announcement returns. Untabulated tests find similar
results for long-run performance measures. This result suggests
140. See supra Table 1.
141. See supra Table 1.
142. See infra Table 2.
143. See infra Table 2.
144. See supra Table 1.
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shareholder voting does not improve acquisition performance. These
results are also consistent with both (1) NASDAQ firms having an
embedded valuation discount resulting from their selection to list on
an exchange with reduced shareholder voting requirements,
assuming the firm has an ability to choose the exchange on which
they are listed, and (2) NASDAQ firms using the optimal deal
structure when not constrained by voting rules.
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TABLE 2: PRE-NASDAQ RULE CHANGE1 45
Panel A. Logistic Regression of the Likelihood of Acquirer Issuing
> 20% of Its Stock
VOTEit = flo + ,31NASDAQit + / 2 CONTROLSi, + E
Variable Pred. Coefficient (p-value)
Intercept ? 1.964 (0.300)
NASDAQ + 1.434** (0.000)
MTB ? 0.00797 (0.714)
LN MARKET ? 0.283*** (0.008)
INTRISK ? -26.88 (0.476)
AAA ? -59.93*** (0.000)
REL SIZE ? -0.548* (0.078)
SERTAL 9 0.0704 (0.875)
TIME ? 0.260*** (0.000)
N 1,079
Panel B: OLS Regression of Announcement Window CAR of Acquirer
CAR, t =,8o + flNASDAQ*VOTEi,t + f2NASDAQi,t +fl3VOTEi,t
+ I 4CONTROLSi, t + E
Variable Pred. Coefficient (p-value)
Intercept ? 0.0472*** (0.000)
NASDAQ*VOTE - 0.0150 (0.353)
NASDAQ ? -0.00429 (0.535)
VOTE ? -0.0115 (0.258)
PUBLIC -0.0145** (0.0050)
LN MARKET -0.00522*** (0.0030)
BOA ? -0.0201 (0.255)
MTB ? 0.00391*** (0.000)
REL SIZE ? -0.0000397*** (0.000)
SERIAL ? -0.0183 (0.105)
N 1,076
B. Main Descriptive Statistics
Table 3, Panel A presents the acquisitions used in our analysis
broken out by year and exchange. 146  Note that there are no
acquisitions in 1989 because, as discussed above, the main sample
excludes the transition period from January 10, 1989, to July 18,
145. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels,
respectively. Huber-White robust standard errors are clustered by firm and are
used to control for heteroscedasticity and serial correlation. When predictions
are made, p-values are one-tailed. For definitions of variables, see infra
Appendix.
146. See infra Table 3.
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1990, when the shareholder voting threshold was set at 25%.
Specifically, the NASDAQ rule change occurred on January 9, 1989,
and no deals meeting the sample requirements were completed in the
first week of 1989. The years 1990 and 1993 have relatively fewer
deals than surrounding years for similar reasons. Because of the date
of the 1990 law change, only about half of the deals announced in 1990
and 1993 are included. Table 3, Panel B presents the same details for
the subsample of transactions in which the acquirer issued more than
20% of its stock. 147 Consistent with H1, NASDAQ contains a
relatively large proportion of acquirers that issue more than 20%.
However, there is little change in the percentage of deals that exceed
the voting threshold for NASDAQ acquirers from before to after the
adoption of the shareholder voting rule.
TABLE 3: NUMBER OF ACQUISITIONS BY ANNOUNCEMENT
YEAR AND EXCHANGE 148
Panel A: Acquisitions
Year Total NASDAQ NASDAQ (%) Other Other (%)
1986 172 42 24.42% 130 75.58%
1987 144 49 34.03% 95 65.97%
1988 153 66 43.14% 87 56.86%
1989 0 0 n/a 0 n/a
1990 75 33 44.00% 42 56.00%
1991 177 90 50.85% 87 49.15%
1992 211 97 45.97% 114 54.03%
1993 110 65 59.09% 45 40.91%
Total 1,042 442 42.42% 600 57.58%
Panel B: Acquisitions Where Acquirer Issues More than 20% of Shares
Year Total NASDAQ NASDAQ (%) Other Other (%)
1986 34 16 47.06% 18 52.94%
1987 30 19 63.33% 11 36.67%
1988 22 15 68.18% 7 31.82%
1989 0 0 na 0 n/a
1990 15 7 46.67% 8 53.33%
1991 52 27 51.92% 25 48.08%
1992 59 37 62.71% 22 37.29%
1993 28 20 71.43% 8 28.57%
Total 240 141 58.75% 99 41.25%
147. See infra Table 3.
148. The authors' calculations are based on the sample obtained from SDC.
The sample size in this table (1,042) differs slightly from the full regression
sample of 1,079 because the full sample includes pre-rule-change period deals
with effective dates from January 10, 1986, to January 9, 1989. A few such were
announced prior to 1986 and thus are excluded from this table.
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Table 4, Panel A provides a comparison of our main variables
across the pre- and post-rule-change periods. 149 Table 4, Panel B
presents similar statistics for only NASDAQ firms, providing a simple
difference test of H1.150 Importantly, Panel A (i.e., the full sample)
shows an increase in the percentage of acquisitions in which acquirers
issue more than 20% of their stock after the rule change (VOTE) as
well as a higher announcement cumulative abnormal return (CAR).151
Thus, comparing the period before the NASDAQ rule change with the
period after shows an overall increase in acquisitions involving the
issuance of over 20% of the acquirer's stock as well as higher
announcement returns. Panel B (i.e., the NASDAQ sample) shows
that, contrary to the overall increase in stock transactions that
require a vote, NASDAQ acquirers saw no increase in the percentage
of deals requiring a vote as compared to those pre-rule deals that
would have required a vote had there been a voting rule. This is
generally consistent with H1, suggesting that the implementation of
the voting rule at NASDAQ deterred the issuance of stock in
acquisitions compared to stock issuance activity on other exchanges,
which had no change in shareholder voting rules.152
Finally, Table 4, Panel C presents a simple difference between
NASDAQ firms issuing 20% or more of their shares before and after
the implementation of the NASDAQ rule change to provide insight
into H2.153 Consistent with H2, we find weak evidence of more
positive CARs after the rule change. Interestingly, Table 4, Panel C
shows no significant difference between the time taken to complete
deals before and after the enactment of the shareholder voting rule.154
This finding is consistent with the results in Table 1, Panel B and
contrasts with that of Kamar 55 and with regulators' beliefs that
shareholder voting requirements delay deal completion time, thereby
imposing an unnecessary cost on acquirers.
149. See infra Table 4.
150. See infra Table 4.
151. See infra Table 4.
152. Consistent with H2, which suggests that NASDAQ acquirers should see
an incremental increase in returns compared to other exchanges in response to
the newly enacted shareholder voting rule, NASDAQ acquirers saw an increase
in announcement returns somewhat larger than those of the overall market.
However, since these results do not control for firm and deal characteristics
known to influence acquirer returns, we leave inferences to our full difference-in-
difference results in Subpart III.C.
153. See infra Table 4.
154. See infra Table 4.
155. Kamar, supra note 88, at 40.
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TABLE 4: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS-PRE- VS.
POST-NASDAQ RULE CHANGE 156
Panel A: Full Sample
Pre-Rule Change Post-Rule Change Difference
Variable N Mean SD N Mean SD Diff. p-value
VOTE 506 0.190 0.392 573 0.269 0.444 0.079*** (0.002)
CAR 503 0.021 0.085 573 0.055 0.168 0.0345*** (0.000)
MTB 506 0.332 0.471 573 0.497 0.500 0.165*** (0.000)
INTRISK 473 1.234 3.169 547 1.484 1.630 0.251 (0.106)
AAA 506 0.023 0.003 573 0.020 0.001 -0.00325*** (0.000)
GNP 506 0.094 0.003 573 0.082 0.007 -0.0122*** (0.000)
INDSHK 506 5.768 0.187 573 6.520 0.176 0.752*** (0.000)
CHG CASH 506 0.244 0.375 573 0.126 0.150 -0.119*** (0.000)
STINTILTINT 506 11.474 72.430 573 2.006 12.725 -9.468*** (0.002)
REL SIZE 506 0.841 0.026 573 0.648 0.117 -0.193*** (0.000)
SERIAL 473 9.422 182.353 547 0.548 1.163 -8.874 (0.255)
TIME 506 0.095 0.293 573 0.166 0.372 0.0709*** (0.001)
PUBLIC 506 3.726 1.845 573 3.764 1.826 0.0374 (0.738)
LN MARKET 506 0.468 0.499 573 0.234 0.424 -0.235*** (0.000)
ROA 473 4.988 1.573 547 4.171 1.830 -0.817*** (0.000)
Panel B: NASDAQ Acquirers Only
Pre-Rule Change Post-Rule Change Difference
Variable N Mean SD N Mean SD Diff. p-value
VOTE 168 0.327 0.471 285 0.319 0.467 -0.0081 (0.859)
CAR 166 0.022 0.093 285 0.066 0.182 0.0442*** (0.004)
MTB 156 1.265 1.171 275 1.777 2.113 0.513*** (0.005)
INTRISK 168 0.022 0.003 285 0.020 0.001 -0.00250*** (0.000)
AAA 168 0.094 0.003 285 0.081 0.007 -0.0134** (0.000)
GNP 168 5.807 0.181 285 6.528 0.178 0.721*** (0.000)
INDSHK 168 0.230 0.271 285 0.113 0.146 -0.118*** (0.000)
CHG CASH 168 14.344 81.031 285 2.941 15.100 -11.40** (0.021)
STINTILTINT 168 0.843 0.027 285 0.645 0.112 -0.198*** (0.000)
REL SIZE 156 0.961 1.841 275 0.527 0.726 -0.435*** (0.001)
SERIAL 168 0.107 0.310 285 0.077 0.267 -0.0299 (0.279)
TIME 168 3.460 2.078 285 3.832 1.793 0.372** (0.045)
PUBLIC 168 0.458 0.500 285 0.221 0.416 -0.237*** (0.000)
LN MARKET 156 4.393 1.402 275 3.718 1.709 -0.675*** (0.000)
ROA 157 0.023 0.129 275 (0.111) 0.664 -0.134** (0.013)
156. This table presents summary statistics with univariate results
comparing average changes in firm, deal, and macroeconomic factors before and
after the NASDAQ rule change. ***, **, * indicate significant differences in
means between pre- and post-variables at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level,
respectively. For definitions of variables, see infra Appendix.
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Panel C: NASDAQ Acquirers Only Where Acquirer Issues More than 20% of
Shares
Pre-Rule Change Post-Rule Change Difference
Variable N Mean SD N Mean SD Diff. p-value
CAR 54 0.015 0.082 91 0.061 0.179 0.0463* (0.075)
MTB 46 1.231 1.101 87 2.253 1.951 1.022*** (0.001)
INTRISK 55 0.023 0.003 91 0.020 0.001 -0.00272*** (0.000)
AAA 55 0.094 0.003 91 0.080 0.006 -0.0145*** (0.000)
GNP 55 5.785 0.188 91 6.555 0.165 0.770*** (0.000)
INDSHK 55 0.241 0.247 91 0.093 0.112 -0.148*** (0.000)
CHG CASH 55 43.194 137.789 91 4.418 18.137 -38.78*** (0.009)
STINTILTINT 55 0.843 0.023 91 0.618 0.084 -0.224*** (0.000)
REL SIZE 46 0.395 0.313 87 0.519 0.581 0.123 (0.183)
SERIAL 55 0.145 0.356 91 0.066 0.250 -0.0795 (0.115)
TIME 55 4.370 1.661 91 4.280 1.598 -0.0907 (0.744)
PUBLIC 55 0.655 0.480 91 0.363 0.483 -0.292*** (0.001)
LN _ALRKET 46 5.118 1.489 87 3.854 1.913 -1.264*** (0.000)
ROA 46 0.001 0.177 87 (0.126) 0.425 -0.127* (0.055)
C. Main Results: Full Sample
We next present our results from estimating the logistic model
testing whether the shareholder voting rule affected firms' method of
payment (H1) in Table 5.157 Our findings suggest that NASDAQ firms
are less likely to issue enough shares to meet the shareholder voting
threshold after the implementation of the shareholder voting rule.
Economically, the rule change had a significant effect on the number
of NASDAQ deals that issued an amount of stock that exceeded the
shareholder voting threshold. The proportion of NASDAQ deals
where share issuance exceeded the voting threshold decreased by 45%
unconditionally following the rule change. 158 This suggests that
shareholder voting rules entice acquirers to structure deals
differently than they otherwise would in order to avoid the
157. See infra Table 5. In general, interaction terms, which are the variables
of interest, are difficult to interpret in nonlinear models as the treatment effects
can have a different sign than the coefficient. See, e.g., Chunrong Ai & Edward
C. Norton, Interaction Terms in Logit and Probit Models, 80 EcON. LE~rrERS 123,
123 (2003). However, Puhani shows that in difference-in-difference models, the
treatment effect and the coefficient have the same sign. Patrick A. Puhani, The
Treatment Effect, the Cross Difference, and the Interaction Term in Nonlinear
"Difference-in-Differences "Models, 115 ECON. LETTERS 85, 85 (2012).
158. The unconditional marginal effect (45%) is derived by first calculating
the conditional marginal effect at the population means from our main regression
estimation (-0.1483, untabulated). The conditional marginal effect is then scaled
by the unconditional mean for the proportion of deals by NASDAQ acquirers
requiring a vote in the pre-rule-change period (Table 4, Panel B: 0.327). A 45%
reduction of the proportion of voting deals before the rule change leads to a post-
rule-change proportion of 0.179.
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shareholder voting requirement. This result is consistent with
regulators' concerns about the costs of shareholder voting rules.
These results hold with (Column 2) and without (Column 1) control
variables. 159
TABLE 5: LOGISTIC DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCE REGRESSION OF THE
LIKELIHOOD OF ACQUIRER ISSUING > 20% OF ITS STOCK 160
VOTEi,t =,80 + ,8POST*NASDAQit + ,82NASDAQit + ,83POSTt
+,84CONTROLSi,t + c
Coefficient (p-value) Coefficient (p-value)
Variable Pred. (1) (2)
Intercept ? -1.980"** (0.000) -7.508 (0.695)
POST*NASDA - -0.744*** (0.0070) -0.990*** (0.0025)
Q
NASDAQ ? 1.260** (0.000) 1.600** (0.000)
POST ? 0.707*** (0.001) 0.940** (0.046)
MTB 9 0.0364 (0.182)
LN MARKET 0.0356 (0.533)
INTRISK ? 107.1 (0.499)
AAA 9 3.230 (0.958)
GNP ? 0.307 (0.863)
INDSHK ? 0.444 (0.103)
CHG CASH ? -0.467*** (0.008)
STINTILTINT ? 0.00536*** (0.004)
REL SIZE ? -0.593 (0.638)
SERIAL ? 0.0189 (0.943)
TIME ? 0.283*** (0.000)
N 1,079 1,020
Having examined the effect of a new shareholder voting
requirement on managers' deal structure choices, the second main
question is addressed: whether a shareholder vote benefits
shareholders?
159. This test includes all acquisitions. Results are virtually identical when
examining only acquisitions that use at least some stock as consideration.
Because firms can choose 0% as the amount of stock issued in an acquisition, we
believe it is most appropriate to examine our hypothesis in the set of all
acquisitions.
160. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels,
respectively. Huber-White robust standard errors are clustered by firm and are
used to control for heteroscedasticity and serial correlation. When predictions
are made, p-values are one-tailed. Column 2 includes control variables while
Column 1 does not. For definitions of variables, see infra Appendix.
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H2: Acquirers subject to shareholder voting requirements make
better acquisition decisions, resulting in better acquisition
performance.
This Article examines whether shareholder voting requirements
affect performance by examining several different performance
measures. First, short-run returns are examined. Using a similar
difference-in-difference methodology as before, we analyze the three-
day CARs surrounding the announcement date of the acquisitions.
Abnormal returns are measured using a Fama-French three-factor
model with an estimation window from day -255 to day -42. Our
short-term measure of an acquirer's performance is then the CAR
from day -1 to day 1, where the event date (day 0) is the acquisition
announcement date. 16 1
Next, this Article examines long-run performance in a difference-
in-difference design using three different long-run performance
measures. Accounting-based measures of profitability are examined
using the acquirer's change in industry-adjusted return on assets
("ROA") (AROA) and return on equity ("ROE") (AROE) from before to
after the acquisition, following prior literature. 162 AROA equals
average industry-adjusted ROA, where ROA equals net income scaled
by the average assets over the prior two years, for the first three years
following the completion of the acquisition as compared to the average
industry-adjusted ROA measure for the three years ending prior to
the completion of the acquisition. The Article measures AROE
similarly, with the only difference being that ROE equals net income
scaled by common equity instead of assets. Our industry adjustment
to firm i's year t ROA or ROE is performed by subtracting the median
of the industry's average ROA or ROE, respectively, in year t
measured at the 2-digit SIC code level. We also examine buy-and-
hold returns (BHAR) for the holding period beginning with the first
trading day after the acquisition effective date and continuing to 255
trading days after the acquisition effective date.
Empirically, testing the effect of the NASDAQ rule on the
acquirer's performance requires a three-way interaction term, as we
focus on the reaction for post-rule change NASDAQ acquirers that
were subject to the shareholder voting requirements. Therefore, we
use the following ordinary least squares ("OLS") model to test
whether NASDAQ-listed acquirers make better acquisitions when
required to obtain shareholder approval:
161. Our results hold using longer cumulative abnormal measures such as
(-3,+3) and (-5,+5) as well as a run-up CAR calculated from -42 days before
announcement until completion as in Leonce L. Bargeron et al., Why Do Private
Acquirers Pay So Little Compared to Public Acquirers?, 89 J. FIN. ECON. 375, 378
(2008).
162. Alexander Edwards et al., Trapped Cash and the Profitability of Foreign
Acquisitions, 33 CONTEMP. ACcT. RES. 44, 74 (2016).
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MODEL 2
Bo + 61POST*NASDAQ*VOTEi,t + B2POST*NASDAQi,t + BaPOSTi,tPERF,t~
+ 84VOTEi,t + B5NASDAQi,t + 66CONTROLSi,t + e
The dependent variable PERF represents CAR, AROA, AROE, or
BHAR, as noted above. Other variables are as previously defined and
detailed in the Appendix. Under H2, a positive coefficient on fl is
expected if the NASDAQ shareholder voting requirement adds value
for the acquiring firm and its shareholders.
The results from the OLS difference-in-difference regression
testing H2, examining if NASDAQ acquirers experience better
performance when shareholders vote on the acquisition, are
presented in Tables 6 and 7.163 This Article presents results for the
CARs at the announcement date of the acquisition in Table 6,164 and
Table 7 presents results for our long-runperformance measures. 165
Examining announcement CARs, there is no evidence of a
significant positive market reaction to NASDAQ deals that required
a shareholder vote.16 6 This result contrasts the findings of Becht et
al., which focuses on the U.K., where there is no discretion to avoid a
shareholder vote.167 In the setting discussed in this Article, when
managers do have the ability to use their discretion to structure an
acquisition that avoids shareholder voting thresholds, shareholder
voting does not improve acquisition performance. This finding also
contrasts the finding by Li et al., who argue that managers only seek
acquisitions with large synergistic gains when shareholder voting is
required.168 The results here suggest that, in the period after the
initial implementation of the shareholder voting rule, managers use
their discretion to alter the method of payment but do not subject only
high-quality deals to a shareholder vote. Thus, the results indicate
that the existence of the voting rule itself did not affect acquisition
performance.
163. See infra Table 6
164. See infra Table 6.
165. See infra Table 7.
166. This test includes all acquisitions. Results are virtually identical in the
subsample of acquisitions that use at least some stock as consideration.
167. Becht et al., supra note 78, at 3041.
168. Li et al., supra note 79, at 31-33.
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TABLE 6: OLS REGRESSION OF ANNOUNCEMENT WINDOW CAR OF
ACQUIRER 169
CARi,t =flo + iPOST*NASDAQ*VOTEi,t + fl2POST*NASDAQit + flaPOSTi,t
+ /34VOTEt + /3sNASDAQi,t + /66CONTROLSi,t + e
Coefficient (p-value) Coefficient (p-value)
Variable Pred. (1) (2)
Intercept ? 0.0223*** (0.003) 0.0904*** (0.000)
POST*NASDAQ
*VOTE + 0.0109 (0.3040) -0.0000231 (0.4995)
POST"NASDAQ ? 0.0145 (0.439) 0.0109 (0.575)
POST ? 0.0261** (0.017) 0.0144 (0.229)
VOTE ? -0.0184 (0.136) 0.00313 (0.821)
NASDAQ ? 0.00586 (0.655) -0.00946 (0.497)
PUBLIC -0.0298*** (0.0015)
LN MARKET -0.0109*** (0.000)
BOA ? -0.0129 (0.311)
MTB ? 0.00324* (0.086)
REL SIZE ? -0.0000535 (0.128)
SERIAL 9 -0.0169 (0.215)
N 1,076 1,016
Finally, in Table 7, this Article examines if the acquirers subject
to the NASDAQ voting rule experience 1etter long-run performance
despite no improvement in short-run performance (i.e.,
announcement CARs).170 Column 1 presents results for AROA,
Column 2 presents results for AROE, and Column 3 presents results
for BHAR.171 For ease of presentation, only results including control
variables are presented. There is no evidence of an improvement in
long-run performance after the enactment of the shareholder voting
rule, regardless of measure. Thus, the findings are consistent with
shareholder voting affecting the managers' choice of structure for a
deal but not the quality of deals subject to a vote.
169. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels,
respectively. Huber-White robust standard errors are clustered by firm and are
used to control for heteroscedasticity and serial correlation. When predictions
are made, p-values are one-tailed. Column 2 includes control variables while
Column 1 does not. For definitions of variables, see infra Appendix.
170. See infra Table 7.
171. See infra Table 7.
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TABLE 7: OLS REGRESSION OF LONG-RUN ACQUIRER
PERFORMANCE 172
PERFt = f0o + jIPOSThNASDAQ*VOTEit + I 2POST*NASDAQit + /3POSTit + /4VOTEi,t
+ /3sNASDAQi,t + /6CONTROLSi,t +e
PERF = AROA AROE BHAR
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient
(p-value) (p-value) (p-value)
Variable Pred. (1) (2) (3)
Intercept ? -0.0358 (0.185) 2.238 (0.220) 5.421"* (0.022)
POSTNASDAQ
*VOTE + -0.0296 (0.355) 0.452 (0.1620) 0.909 (0.3570)
POST-NASDAQ ? 0.0430 (0.185) 0.608 (0.534) 0.554 (0.720)
POST ? -0.0194 (0.293) -1.008 (0.380) 0.805 (0.231)
VOTE ? 0.0116 (0.509) -0.225 (0.514) 0.0957 (0.763)
NASDAQ ? -0.0398** (0.038) -1.411 (0.155) -0.899* (0.059)
PUBLIC ? -0.0208 (0.153) -0.904* (0.090) -0.550 (0.221)
LN MARKET ? 0.00783 (0.164) -0.173 (0.378) -1.127"* (0.030)
ROA ? 0.0522 (0.455) 0.0814 (0.821) 0.514 (0.263)
MTB ? 0.000345 (0.932) -0.0291 (0.258) -0.0504 (0.224)
REL SIZE ? 0.0000498*** (0.001) -0.00158** (0.013) -0.00193 (0.128)
SERIAL ? 0.00663 (0.650) -0.885 (0.160) -0.156 (0.693)
TIME ? -0.00319 (0.440) 0.0894 (0.288) 0.233 (0.476)
N 964 963 1,016
D. Cross-Sectional Results
This Article's empirical analyses have not yet considered the
possibility that our results are driven by some unobserved
characteristics of acquirers rather than the adoption of shareholder
voting requirements. To address this concern, serial acquirers and
firms with strong corporate governance are examined, using
institutional ownership as a proxy for governance strength. First, a
central insight of legal literature is that the repeat player enjoys
considerable advantages over the "one-shotter.1 73 In the acquisition
172. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels,
respectively. Huber-White robust standard errors are clustered by firm and are
used to control for heteroscedasticity and serial correlation. When predictions
are made, p-values are one-tailed. For definitions of variables, see infra
Appendix.
173. See, e.g., Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations
on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 L. & Soc'y REV. 95, 97 (1974) (defining "one-
shotters" as "actors into those claimants who have only occasional recourse to the
courts"); Maya Steinitz, Whose Claim Is This Anyway: Third-Party Litigation
Funding, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1268, 1300 (2011) (describing "one-shotters" as
"claimants who have only occasional recourse to the courts'); Shauhin Talesh,
How the "Haves" Come out Ahead in the Twenty-First Century, 62 DEPAUL L. REV.
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field, prior literature isolates acquirer characteristics by performing
cross-sectional tests based on whether an acquirer is a serial
acquirer. 174 Using this distinction enables us to assess the change in
the method of payment and performance due to the shareholder
voting rules for acquirers that remain static through time.175 Since
serial acquirers are likely to have more familiarity with the
structuring of acquisition deals, it is expected that serial acquirers
exhibit a stronger response to the shareholder voting rule change
compared to acquirers completing acquisitions less frequently. In
contrast, less frequent acquirers may focus more on completing their
deal and less on adjusting the method of payment to avoid
shareholder voting rules.
Table 8, Panel A presents results for the likelihood of meeting the
voting threshold, and Panel B for the announcement CAR, for the full
sample of firms split between nonserial acquirers (Column 1) and
serial acquirers (Column 2).176 Results in Panel A show that both
serial and nonserial acquirers alter their deal structure following the
enactment of the shareholder voting rule.177 However, the effect is
significantly stronger for serial acquirers (p-value = 0.031, one-tailed,
untabulated). This suggests that serial acquirers, which are more
familiar with structuring deals, respond more strongly to acquisition-
related rules. Consistent with the main results, Panel B presents no
evidence of significantly positive market returns for NASDAQ
acquirers subject to the voting requirements for either serial or
nonserial acquirers.
519, 519 (2013) (noting the challenges faced by one-shotters to achieve
"significant reform through the legal system").
174. This Article defines a serial acquirer as a firm that completes five or more
acquisitions during our sample period. See also Kathleen Fuller, Jeffry Netter &
Mike Stegemoller, What Do Returns to Acquiring Firms Tell Us? Evidence from
Firms that Make Many Acquisitions, 57 J. FIN. 1763, 1763-64 (2002).
175. Id.
176. See infra Table 7.
177. See infra Table 7.
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TABLE 8: SERIAL ACQUIRERS 178
Panel A- Logistic Difference-in-Difference Regression of the
Likelihood of Acquirer Issuing > 20% of Its Stock
VOTEi,t = 1o + fl 1POST*NASDAQi,t + fl2NASDAQit + / 3POSTJt
+ fl4CONTROLSit + e
Exclude Serial Serial Acquirers
Subsample: Acquirers Only
Coefficient (p-value) Coefficient (p-value)
Variable Pred. (1) (2)
Intercept ? -0.00748 (1.000) -584.4* (0.072)
POSThNASDAQ - -0.867** (0.0130) -3.252*** (0.0035)
NASDAQ ? 1.488** (0.000) 2.821** (0.005)
POST ? 1.123* (0.034) 4.277* (0.067)
MTB ? 0.0316 (0.304) 0.611* (0.065)
LNMARKET ? 0.0231 (0.726) 0.00511 (0.978)
INTRISK ? 56.37 (0.733) 7423.1- (0.080)
AAA ? -27.11 (0.666) 1646.0- (0.063)
GNP ? -0.405 (0.829) 44.85* (0.073)
INDSHK ? 0.499** (0.032) -1.201 (0.411)
CHG CASH ? 0.00538*** (0.001) -0.113 (0.241)
STINTILTINT ? 0.219 (0.867) 5.416 (0.410)
REL SIZE ? -0.452** (0.014) -0.352 (0.384)
TIME ? 0.278*** (0.000) 0.524** (0.014)
N 896 124
178. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels,
respectively. Huber-White robust standard errors are clustered by firm and are
used to control for heteroscedasticity and serial correlation. When predictions
are made, p-values are one-tailed. For definitions of variables, see infra
Appendix.
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Panel B: OLS Regression of Announcement Window CAR of Acquirer
CARit = /8o + ,IPOST*NASDAQ*VOTEi,t + /I2POSTNASDAQi,t + f3POSTit
+ /34VOTEi,t + IsNASDAQt + /36CONTROLSit + e
Exclude Serial Serial Acquirers
Subsample: Acquirers Only
Coefficient (p-value) Coefficient (p-value)
Variable Pred. (1) (2)
Intercept ? 0.102** (0.000) -0.00609 (0.834)
POSTNASDAQ
*VOTE + -0.00241 (0.937) -0.0139 (0.723)
POST*NASDAQ ? 0.0182 (0.379) -0.0359 (0.410)
POST ? 0.00894 (0.422) 0.0393** (0.029)
VOTE ? 0.00659 (0.761) -0.0215 (0.277)
NASDAQ ? -0.0149 (0.209) 0.0357 (0.119)
PUBLIC - -0.0295*** (0.0005) -0.0286** (0.0320)
LN MARKET - -0.0130*** (0.001) 0.00381 (0.1700)
ROA ? -0.0114 (0.553) -0.0707 (0.288)
MTB ? 0.00335*** (0.005) -0.00898 (0.256)
REL SIZE ? -0.0000592*** (0.000) -0.00235 (0.838)
N 894 122
In addition to an acquirer's familiarity with deal structuring, it
may be that an acquirer's existing level of corporate governance
affects the way in which managers or shareholders respond to
shareholder voting rules. As suggested by NASDAQ's request for
comment, 179 an acquiring firm that is already subject to strong
outside monitoring by shareholders may care very little about the
adoption of shareholder voting rules because shareholder discipline
on the manager is already high. On the contrary, shareholders with
little discipline over a manager would likely find the adoption of
shareholder voting rules extremely beneficial. Finally, it could be the
case that the effect of shareholder voting requirements on the method
of payment and performance does not vary with the level of
shareholder discipline on the manager. This Article examines the
extent to which shareholder voting rules may be a complement to,
rather than a substitute for, corporate governance.
To address regulators' expectations that the level of corporate
governance affects the impact of shareholder voting requirements, an
empirical analysis is formed by splitting our sample based on the level
of corporate governance. Firms with higher institutional ownership
(1O) are designated as having better governance.1 80 Agency theory
179. Press Release, NASDAQ, supra note 5.
180. See, e.g., Stuart L. Gillan & Laura T. Starks, Corporate Governance
Proposals and Shareholder Activism: The Role of Institutional Investors, 57 J.
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proposes that firms are subject to inherent agency costs due to the
separation of ownership and control and the asymmetry of
information between shareholders and managers.1 8 1 To mitigate
these agency costs, shareholders incur costs to monitor managers and
induce decisions that are consistent with shareholder interest. 8 2
Because monitoring is a costly endeavor for shareholders, it gives rise
to a free-rider problem.18 3 In other words, no single shareholder is
willing to shoulder the monitoring costs when he or she must share
any resulting gains pro rata with his or her fellow shareholders.
However, large institutional owners have an incentive to incur
such monitoring costs. 8 4 Therefore, institutional owners, acting as
external monitors on firms' behavior,1 8 5 reduce the agency problem
between shareholders and managers, thereby improving governance.
Specifically, institutional investors provide monitoring in several
ways. Institutional owners monitor management's performance and
can push for changes in management if performance lags.186
Institutions are more involved in shareholder voting18 7 and facilitate
the market for corporate control.'8 8 In addition to monitoring
financial performance, institutions can monitor operational
performance and therefore are generally better able to monitor firms
when they are closer to the firm or have easier access to the firm's
location.189
Table 9, Panel A presents results where the dependent variable
is the likelihood of issuing a number of shares that triggers the voting
threshold, and Panel B presents results where the dependent variable
FIN. ECON. 275, 277 (2000) (arguing that corporations with a large minority
shareholder makeup are better governed). Due to the time period in the sample,
only a limited number of governance measures are available.
181. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm:
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON.
305, 328 (1976).
182. Id.
183. Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Large Shareholders and Corporate
Control, 94 J. POL. ECON. 461, 461-62 (1986).
184. See, e.g., Gillan & Starks, supra note 180, at 279.
185. Sanjeev Bhojraj & Partha Sengupta, Effect of Corporate Governance on
Bond Ratings and Yields: The Role of Institutional Investors and Outside
Directors, 76 J. Bus. 455, 456 (2003); Miguel A. Ferreira & Pedro Matos, The
Colors of Investors'Money: The Role of Institutional Investors around the World,
88 J. FIN. ECON. 499, 514-15 (2008); Jay C. Hartzell & Laura T. Starks,
Institutional Investors and Executive Compensation, 58 J. FIN. 2351, 2351 (2003).
186. Shleifer & Vishny, supra note 183, at 462.
187. James A- Brickley et al., Ownership Structure and Voting on
Antitakeover Amendments, 20 J. FIN. ECON. 267, 268 (1988).
188. See Shleifer & Vishny, supra note 183, at 465.
189. Benjamin C. Ayers et al., Hometown Advantage: The Effects of
Monitoring Institution Location on Financial Reporting Discretion, 52 J. ACCT. &
ECON. 41, 59 (2011); Shai Bernstein et al., The Impact of Venture Capital
Monitoring, 71 J. FIN. 1591, 1612 (2016).
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is the announcement CAR.190 Column I presents results for poor-
governance firms; Column 2 presents results for good-governance
firms.191 In general, results in Panel A suggest that both good- and
poor-governance firms alter their deal structures to avoid shareholder
voting, consistent with our main results. This result contrasts the
findings by Li et al., who conclude that firms with higher institutional
ownership are less likely to alter their deal structure.192 Results in
Panel B show no evidence that the NASDAQ shareholder voting rule
results in higher announcement returns regardless of the level of
governance of the acquirer. 93
As with the main results, results in Panel B are inconsistent with
related results by Li et al., who find better performance for well-
governed acquirers.1 94 Again, this inconsistency is likely because Li
et al. do not consider the strategic avoidance of the vote. This
suggests that, contrary to the SEC's view, the effect of shareholder
voting rules does not vary with corporate governance. However, this
Article acknowledges that governance structures during the period of
this study may differ substantially from more recent periods.
190. See infra Table 9.
191. See infra Table 9. In untabulated results, we confirm our findings using
an alternative proxy for existing levels of corporate governance. Following
Harford et al., we use the existing level of cash holdings to indicate governance
levels because Harford et al.'s baseline findings show firms with higher cash
balances have better governance on average. Harford et al. Corporate
Governance and Firm Cash Holdings in US, 87 J. FIN. ECON. 535, 537 (2008). As
such, we designate high-cash firms as good-governance firms, and our results
hold.
192. See Li et al., supra note 79, at 34.
193. See infra Table 9. In untabulated tests on long-run performance, we find
no consistent results suggesting that either poor- or good-governance firms
experience better long-run performance.
194. See Li et aL, supra note 79, at 33-34.
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TABLE 9: SAMPLE SPLITS BASED ON GOVERNANCE
Panel A. Logistic Difference-in-Difference Regression of the Likelihood
of Acquirer Issuing > 20% of Its Stock
VOTE, =,8o + I61POST*NASDAQi,t + /32NASDAQit + flaPOSTi,t
+/34CONTROLSi,t +e
Subsample: Poor Governance Good Governance
Governance variable for
splitting sample: IO 1O
Coefficient (p-value) Coefficient (p-value)
Variable Pred. (1) (2)
Intercept ? -24.43 (0.489) -3.348 (0.877)
POST*NASDAQ - -1.070- (0.0885) -1.047*** (0.0085)
NASDAQ ? 1.785** (0.008) 1.553** (0.000)
POST ? 0.660 (0.487) 1.031" (0.070)
MTB ? 0.636*** (0.003) 0.0199 (0.388)
LN MARKET ? 0.244 (0.171) -0.0677 (0.382)
INTRISK ? 282.5 (0.335) 73.40 (0.684)
AAA ? 72.34 (0.511) -13.14 (0.851)
GNP ? 1.461 (0.661) -0.0415 (0.983)
INDSHK ? 0.599 (0.450) 0.421* (0.073)
CHG CASH ? 0.00938*** (0.000) 0.00435** (0.015)
STINTILTINT ? -3.796 (0.162) 0.153 (0.913)
REL SIZE ? -0.162 (0.574) -0.517"* (0.014)
SERIAL ? 0.227 (0.620) -0.0770 (0.835)
TIME ? 0.352** (0.026) 0.296*** (0.000)
N 301 719
[Vol. 53
DOES SHAREHOLDER VOTING MATTER?
Panel B: OLS Regression of Announcement Window CAR of Acquirer
CARit = fio + jIPOST*NASDAQ*VOTEi,t + /32POST*NASDAQi,t + fi3POSTit
+ fl4VOTEi,t + /l5NASDAQi,t + /36CONTROLSit +
Subsample: Poor Governance Good Governance
Governance variable for
splitting sample: 10 10
Coefficient (p-value) Coefficient (p-value)
Variable Pred. (1) (2)
Intercept ? 0.0570** (0.020) 0.0873*** (0.001)
POSYNASDAQ 0.0257 (0.1495) -0.0107 (0.3885)
*VOTE +
POST-NASDAQ ? -0.0341 (0.262) 0.0216 (0.361)
POST ? 0.0106 (0.225) 0.0188 (0.194)
VOTE ? -0.0219 (0.121) 0.0142 (0.600)
NASDAQ ? 0.0199 (0.353) -0.0141 (0.277)
PUBLIC - -0.0382*** (0.000) -0.0242** (0.0150)
LN MRKET - -0.00322 (0.2115) -0.0113** (0.0105)
ROA ? -0.0303 (0.526) -0.00910 (0.633)
MTB ? -0.00384 (0.452) 0.00367*** (0.002)
REL SIZE ? 0.00326 (0.126) -0.0000547*** (0.000)
SERIAL ? 0.00898 (0.411) -0.0340*** (0.003)
N 301 715
E. Mechanism Used to Avoid Shareholder Voting Threshold
Up to this point, this Article finds evidence that firms alter deal
structure to avoid shareholder voting but finds no associated benefit.
Therefore, one potential mechanism firms use to avoid shareholder
voting thresholds is investigated.
A mechanism that may allow acquirers to avoid the shareholder
voting threshold is the use of proceeds from a seasoned equity offering
("SEO"). SEOs are equity issuances by already public firms that raise
additional capital for the firm for expenditures such as capital
investment or recapitalization. 195 SEOs are examined because they
are one of the mechanisms most likely to be employed by acquirers to
avoid shareholder voting. 196  Specifically, in the context of an
acquisition, an SEO is a relatively low-cost source of financing to
achieve the desired goal of reducing share issuance below the voting
195. Ivo Welch, Seasoned Offerings, Imitation Costs, and the Underpricing of
Initial Public Offerings, 44 J. FIN. 421, 445 (1989). Conceptually, SEOs mirror
initial public offerings ("IPOs'), except IPOs are a previously private firm's first
public issuance of equity.
196. See Holderness, supra note 77, at 8.
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threshold in the following way1 97: First, an SEO raises cash, reducing
the need to issue stock in connection with an acquisition (i.e., reducing
the numerator in the voting threshold calculation).198 Second, an
SEO increases the number of shares outstanding (i.e., increasing the
denominator in the voting threshold calculation).1 99 This results in
an SEO generating a double benefit in reducing the percentage of
shares issued in an acquisition. Third, the fact that a firm is
considering issuing equity to complete an acquisition indicates that
the firm believes its equity is correctly (or possibly over) valued and
that the firm currently has a general preference for equity over debt
financing-a positive signal to the market.200 Importantly, although
SEOs result in the issuance of stock, SEOs are generally not subject
to shareholder voting requirements. 201 SEOs thus offer a way for
firms to raise capital to complete an acquisition yet avoid issuing so
much stock in the acquisition that a vote is required.
Given that SEOs are a mechanism likely to be employed by
acquirers planning to avoid a vote, this Article examines the
frequency of SEOs that likely cause an acquirer to fall below the
shareholder voting threshold before and after the implementation of
the NASDAQ rule. Data for the sample of acquirers is obtained from
SDC, gathering all SEOs where funds are specified as being used for
the financing of acquisitions, for future acquisitions, or for general
197. Bilinski et al., Does Liquidity Risk Explain Low Firm Performance
Following Seasoned Equity Offerings?, 36 J. BANKING & FIN. 2770, 2770 (2012).
198. See Seasoned Issue, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms
/s/seasonedissue.asp (last visited Apr. 15, 2018).
199. See Richard Loth, Why do share prices fall after a company has a
secondary offering?, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.comnask/answers
/07/secondary-offering.asp (last visited Apr. 15, 2018).
200. This Article provides examples of firms issuing debt to avoid the
shareholder voting threshold (e.g., Kraft and Time). However, these examples
occurred in cases where firms had to adjust their bids in very short time periods
in response to external events. Completing an SEO is not likely feasible in such
a short period of time.
201. See, e.g., Whole Foods Market, Inc., Definitive Proxy Statement 31
(Schedule 14a) (2017), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/865436
/000120677415002458/wholefoodsdefl4a.htm#Proposal4. This Article
acknowledges that firms generally must obtain shareholder approval to increase
the number of shares authorized by the corporate charter. If a firm was required
to increase its authorized shares in order to perform an SEO, some SEOs could
be considered "subject to a vote." In general, increases in authorized shares are
done well in advance of any immediate need for shares and only loosely connected
to any specific use of the shares. Thus, we view the likelihood of any SEO being
considered subject to a vote to be low. See Peter Haslag, Tapping Untapped
Equity: Financing Frictions and Firm Acquisition Behavior 10 (Feb. 15, 2018)
(unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id
=3052780, for an investigation of acquisition outcomes for firms that are
constrained by the number of authorized shares outstanding. Haslag notes that,
on average, firms authorize approximately three to five times the number of
shares outstanding. Id. Our threshold of interest is 20% of shares outstanding,
thus authorization is not likely to play a major role in our study.
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corporate purposes. The acquirer's SEO issuance must occur within
the 365 days preceding the announcement date of the acquisition. 202
To assess whether acquirers use SEOs to mitigate the
requirement for shareholder voting, we determine the proportion of
deals requiring a shareholder vote as if the SEO did not occur. To
make this determination, a new shareholder voting threshold is
calculated for acquiring firms that issued new equity by increasing
the amount of stock needed to complete the acquisitions by the value
raised in the SEO (i.e., the numerator) and decreasing the shares
outstanding by the number of shares raised in the offering (i.e., the
denominator). This calculation provides a "new" hypothetical
percentage of stock used in the acquisition as if the SEO did not occur.
The number of "new" firms that would have met the shareholder
voting requirements before and after the passage of the NASDAQ rule
is compared taking into account the SEO.
The results from this analysis are presented in Table 10.203
Column 1 presents the number of deals that met the voting threshold
prior to the NASDAQ rule change. 204 Column 2 presents the number
of additional deals that would have met the voting threshold had an
SEO not occurred. 20 5 Column 3 sums Columns 1 and 2, and Column
4 presents the percentage of potential voting deals that avoided the
voting threshold due to SEO.206 Columns 5 through 8 present similar
results for the post-rule-change period.207 Columns 9 and 10 show
and test for differences across time periods. 208 The number of
NASDAQ deals falling below the voting threshold due to SEOs
increased significantly following the implementation of the rule
change (p-value = 0.046). Prior to the rule change, significantly fewer
NASDAQ acquirers, versus acquirers listed on other exchanges, used
SEOs that would have put them below the voting threshold (p-value
= 0.020). Following the change, there is no significant difference in
the proportion of voting deals affected by SEOs across exchanges (p-
value = 0.719). Most importantly, the results show that, following the
rule change, NASDAQ acquirers significantly increased their usage
of this strategy (p-value = 0.077) compared to acquirers on the other
exchanges. These findings suggest NASDAQ may want to consider
amending the shareholder voting rule to account for these SEOs.209
202. In some cases, an acquirer has multiple SEOs or multiple acquisitions
within this 365-day period. In these cases, we assign to each acquisition deal a
weighted average of the total equity raised during the 365-day period, weighted
by the transaction value of each deal.
203. See infra Table 10.
204. See infra Table 10.
205. See infra Table 10.
206. See infra Table 10.
207. See infra Table 10.
208. See infra Table 10.
209. See, e.g., Listing Council Decision 2006-11, NASDAQ LISTING CENTER(July 31, 2012), https://listingcenter.nasdaq.com/MaterialSearch. aspx
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?materials=640&mcd=CD&criteria=2; NASDAQ Staff Interpretation Letter 2014-
1 (Aug. 4, 2014), https:/[listingcenter.nasdaq.com[MaterialSearch.aspx
?materialsll1l3&mcdSI&criteria=2 (discussing transactions that would not
require shareholder approval). Currently, NASDAQ can aggregate private
placement transactions to determine if a series of transactions that, alone, do not
trigger the shareholder voting requirements are in fact one transaction that
should be subject to shareholder voting. However, public offerings such as SEOs
are not currently aggregated.
210. This table presents the frequency of SEO issuance that causes an
acquirer to avoid the shareholder voting threshold. *** ** * indicate significant
differences in means between the pre-rule-change and post-rule-change periods
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. When predictions are made, p-values
are one-tailed.
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In further analysis (untabulated), this Article examines whether
the market reaction varies for NASDAQ firms using SEOs to avoid
the shareholder voting threshold compared to other NASDAQ
acquirers. If the market views SEO issuance to avoid voting
negatively, as an abuse of managerial power, we expect to see more
negative returns to acquisitions which avoided the shareholder voting
threshold by using an SEO. Using a regression analysis in the subset
of post-rule-change NASDAQ acquirers, including all control
variables from Model 2, NASDAQ acquirers using SEOs to avoid the
voting threshold experience approximately 4.66% lower
announcement returns than other NASDAQ acquirers. However, the
lower return falls just short of significance (p-value = 0.114,
untabulated, one-tailed), possibly due to the small sample size of only
seven NASDAQ acquirers using this strategy, as shown in Table
10.211
F. Separate Tests Around the 25% and 20% Threshold
A unique aspect of this setting is that two rule changes occurred
over a short period of time. On January 9, 1989, NASDAQ went from
no acquisition-related shareholder voting requirements to a
requirement for shareholder voting if the acquirer issued 25% or more
of its shares in connection with the acquisition.212 About eighteen
months later, on July 19, 1990, NASDAQ enacted stricter rules
requiring shareholder voting if the acquirer issued 20% or more of its
shares in connection with the acquisition.213
In the main test, this Article focuses on whether the existence of
shareholder voting rules affects the method of payment and
performance in acquisitions. Thus, the thirty-six months prior to the
initial 25% rule (before January 9, 1989) are used as the pre-rule-
change period and the thirty-six months after the final rule (after July
19, 1990) as the post-rule-change period. In this Subpart, each rule
change is separately examined to verify that the results are robust to
the design choice.
The eighteen months prior to and after the initial (25%) rule was
enacted are initially examined. The results are limited to eighteen
months in this test to avoid overlap with the final rule enacted in
1990, just over eighteen months after the initial rule. In this test,
VOTE is set equal to one if the acquirer issued 25% or more of its
shares in connection with the acquisition. In untabulated tests, the
initial enactment of the shareholder voting rule reduced the
211. See supra Table 10.
212. Order Approving Proposed Rule Change Relating to Eligibility Criteria
of NASDAQ National Market System Securities, 59 Fed. Reg. 1463, 1464 (Jan.
13, 1989).
213. Order Approving Proposed Rule Change Relating to Shareholder
Approval of Certain Transactions for NASDAQ National Market System Issuers,
55 Fed. Reg. 30,345, 30,346 (July 25, 1990).
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likelihood of an acquirer issuing a number of shares that triggered
the voting threshold-consistent with the main results-and had no
effect on announcement returns, also consistent with the main
results.
Next, the eighteen months prior to and after the enactment of the
revised (20%) rule are examined. Again, the results are limited to
eighteen months to avoid allowing the pre-event period to spill over
into the period before any shareholder voting rule existed (i.e., the
pre-event period only includes the eighteen-month period covered by
the 25% rule). In this test, VOTE is set equal to one if the acquisition
involved the acquirer issuing 25% (20%) or more of its shares
outstanding in the pre- (post-) rule-change period. In this setting,
there is no evidence that the change to a stricter 20% threshold
affected deal structure any more than the 25% threshold. In other
words, acquirers avoid the 20% threshold to the same extent they
avoid the 25% threshold. Again, there is no statistically significant
effect on announcement returns. Thus, the results are robust to the
original design choice to exclude the period between the
implementation of the initial and revised rules.
IV. IMPLICATIONS
Shareholders have limited powers: they can vote, sell, and sue.
214
State law confines voting to limited areas, but federal securities law
sometimes expands the shareholder franchise outside these core
settings.215 One such expansion of voting rights appears in the form
of shareholder voting in acquisition transactions. 216 These voting
rights may have benefits yet can be costly-not only because of the
mechanics of soliciting and counting votes but also because subjecting
any acquisition transaction to a vote introduces both increased
uncertainty and potential delay.217 Furthermore, if the structure of
the voting rights provides managers with discretion to avoid a
shareholder vote (e.g., to avoid uncertainty and delay), then this vote-
avoidance behavior may lead to suboptimal transaction structuring,
generating costs that ultimately are borne by shareholders. 218 In the
case of Time, discussed earlier, these costs included additional
financing costs in the form of increased debt levels and the
corresponding debt service costs and the resulting decrease in stock
price.219
The question this Article seeks to answer is whether it is
important for shareholders to have a vote on an acquisition
transaction if the acquisition requires the issuance of 20% or more of
214. Edelman et al., supra note 1, at 1375.
215. See Bainbridge, supra note 12, at 708.
216. See Michael, supra note 29, at 1469.
217. See Edelman et al., supra note 1, at 1382.
218. Davidoff Solomon, supra note 23.
219. See supra text accompanying notes 14-23.
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the acquirer's outstanding shares. That is, this Article examines if
the benefits of shareholder voting in acquisitions outweigh the costs.
This question is not merely academic; given changes in corporate
governance over time, such as increasing quality of boards of
directors, increasing levels of institutional ownership, and increasing
degrees of shareholder activism, NASDAQ is currently revisiting
whether some of the additional protections of its shareholder voting
rule remain necessary. NASDAQ requested public comments on the
existing rule,220 making it particularly important to study the effects
of the initial implementation of the NASDAQ rule.
The SEC also has an interest in the outcome of the request for
comments because it must review and approve any proposed rule
changes. The SEC has significant power regarding listing rules under
section 19(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, which states
that the SEC will take action "if it appears to the Commission that
such action is necessary for the protection of investors, the
maintenance of fair and orderly markets, or the safeguarding of
securities or funds."22 1  Thus, the SEC may resist changes to
shareholder voting rules not only to protect investors but also to
provide fair competition among exchanges. 222 This is particularly
relevant because, if NASDAQ determines a rule change is warranted,
other exchanges are likely to follow suit, multiplying the importance
of studying this rule.
This Article uses a unique setting to examine an important and
increasingly studied question: what are the effects of shareholder
voting in acquisitions? It specifically focuses on whether shareholder
voting requirements affect the method of payment and short- and
long-run acquirer performance in acquisitions. This Article uses
NASDAQ's initial implementation of shareholder voting rules as the
setting to examine our questions. This setting is particularly
important now as NASDAQ revisits its existing shareholder approval
requirements.
The first question in imposing any rule is whether it can be
avoided. There is evidence that the existing shareholder voting rules
can be avoided and impose costs in the form of altered deal structures
to specifically avoid a vote, consistent with regulators' concerns.
Additional analysis shows firms use SEOs as a mechanism for
avoiding the shareholder voting threshold. However, results also
suggest little increase in the time it takes to complete an acquisition
after enactment of the shareholder voting rule. Thus, one clear
implication is that, if regulators are serious about mandating
acquiring shareholder votes, triggering the vote based on deal size, as
done in the U.K., is preferable to the gameable U.S. method, which is
based on the percentage of the acquirer's outstanding shares used in
220. Office of the Inv'r Advocate Letter, supra note 7; Zalesin, supra note 68.
221. 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b)(3)(B) (2012).
222. See id.
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an acquisition. Shareholder voting rules based on deal size would
alleviate costs associated with suboptimal deal structures, such as
added financing costs, which managers may currently incur to avoid
the gameable U.S. shareholder voting rule.
The second question focuses on the value of the vote itself. In
contrast to some regulators' beliefs that shareholder voting rules
improve managerial decisions,223 there is no evidence of benefits from
shareholder voting rules measured by either short- or long-run
performance. Acquiring shareholders appear indifferent as to
whether they have a vote on acquisitions.
However, managers display a marked bias against shareholder
votes. The evidence shows NASDAQ acquirers, prior to the
implementation of shareholder voting rules in acquisitions, issued
greater than 20% of their equity in more than twice as many deals as
acquirers using the same consideration structure from other
exchanges, suggesting that acquirers subject to a vote seek to avoid
shareholder approval in acquisitions. Our main results confirm this
finding, showing that after the implementation of new shareholder
voting rules by NASDAQ in early 1989, NASDAQ acquirers
responded by reducing the number of deals subject to the new voting
rules by over 45%. In contrast to existing literature and
commentators' beliefs,224 acquiring firms respond to shareholder
voting requirements irrespective of existing levels of institutional
ownership, a proxy for the level of corporate governance.
Furthermore, there is evidence that serial acquirers, repeat players
who are most familiar with deal structuring are more frequently able
to structure acquisition transactions that avoid a shareholder vote as
compared to those less familiar with deal structuring. Altogether, the
results confirm this Article's Hi that acquirers prefer to avoid
shareholder voting in acquisitions and are able to alter the deal
structure to achieve this desire.
The narrow implication of the study is that deals that undergo a
shareholder vote do not outperform those that avoid a vote. Said
differently, an acquiring firm's shareholder vote does not appear to be
a meaningful disciplining constraint on managers. The reason for
these results may be that there are other, more effective ways to
constrain empire-building managers. One is the market for
managerial talent: firms will not hire executives that overpay for
targets or make value-destroying acquisitions. The market for
corporate control provides a second constraint on empire building.
223. See Order Approving Proposed Rule Change Relating to Eligibility
Criteria for NASDAQ National Market System Securities, 59 Fed. Reg. 1463,
1464 (July 25, 1990); Order Approving Proposed Rule Change Relating to
Shareholder Approval of Certain Transactions for NASDAQ National Market
System Issuers, 55 Fed. Reg. 30,345, 30,346 (Jan. 13, 1989).
224. See, e.g., Bainbridge et al., supra note 1, at 628 (discussing how different
types of investors have varied approaches to corporate governance).
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Firms that overpay, manage acquired firms poorly, or finance
acquisitions suboptimally will suffer decreases in stock price that
make them vulnerable to activists and acquirers. 225 Shareholders can
rely on this constraint rather than the discipline provided by
shareholder voting rules. Put succinctly, bad bidders make good
targets. Our results are more consistent with commentators'
concerns that shareholder voting imposes costs without substantial
benefits. 226
More generally, the lesson may be that, while shareholder voting
is an important constraint, it is a relatively blunt instrument ill-
suited for micromanagement. Government-imposed regulations,
even in the name of additional shareholder protection, risk creating
additional unnecessary costs such as possible suboptimal deal
structuring, which likely leads to additional administrative and
financing costs °and ill-timed SEOs. Therefore, the shareholder
franchise may be best reserved for fundamental corporate changes
and director elections.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article makes two main contributions. First, it explicitly
examines the influence of shareholder voting rules on the structure of
an acquisition and identifies one mechanism-SEOs-which
acquirers use to avoid the shareholder voting threshold. Second, and
contrary to recent literature, this Article finds no evidence that
shareholder voting rules improve short- or long-run acquirer
performance using a unique identification strategy surrounding a
regulatory change in shareholder voting requirements. From a policy
perspective, these findings are particularly important as NASDAQ is
considering revising its voting requirements, with other exchanges
likely to follow any change made by NASDAQ. The results discussed
in this Article are consistent with shareholder voting rules adding
additional costs, but no discernable benefits, to acquiring-firm
shareholders. Additional analysis, comparing the pre- and post-
implementation periods, confirms that shareholder voting rules
significantly alter the method of payment in acquisitions and do not
significantly increase announcement returns, suggesting no material
benefits to the shareholder voting rules.
225. See Andrew C.W. Lund & Gregg D. Polsky, The Diminishing Returns of
Incentive Pay in Executive Compensation Contracts, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 677,
710-11 (2011).
226. See, e.g., Michael, supra note 29, at 1485, 1490 (explaining how new
voting requirements may prove fruitless and unworkable).
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APPENDIX: VARIABLE DEFINITIONS
Variable Definition
Is an indicator variable that equals one if the
acquirer issued 20% or more of its shares outstanding
VOTEi,t in an acquisition and equals zero otherwise.
Equals one of the following performance measures:
PERF,t CAR, AROA, AROE, or BHAR.
Equals Fama-French three-factor model abnormal
returns with an estimation window from day -255 to
day -42, accumulated from day -1 to day 1, where the
CARi,t event date is the acquisition's announcement date.
Equals average industry-adjusted net income, scaled
by the average assets over the prior two years, for the
first three years following the comjiletion of the
acquisition as compared to the average industry-
adjusted ROA measure for the three years ending
prior to the completion of the acquisition. 227 Our
industry adjustment to firm i's year t ROA measure is
performed by subtracting the median of the
industry's average ROA in year t measured at the 2-
AROAi,t digit SIC code level.
Equals average industry-adjusted net income, scaled
by common equity over the prior two years, for the
first three years following the completion of the
acquisition as compared to the average industry-
adjusted ROE measure for the three years ending
prior to the completion of the acquisition. 228 Our
industry adjustment to firm i's year t ROE measure is
performed by subtracting the median of the
industry's average ROE in year t measured at the 2-
AROEi,t digit SIC code level.
Equals the acquirer's one-year post-acquisition buy-
and-hold return beginning with the first trading day
after the acquisition is effective until 255 trading
BHARi,t days after completion of the acquisition.
Is an indicator variable that equals one in the period
after the NASDAQ enacted its final 20% threshold
POSTi,t rule and equals zero otherwise.
Is an indicator variable that equals one if the
acquirer is listed on the NASDAQ and equals zero
NASDAQi.t otherwise.
227. See generally Alexander Edwards et al., Trapped Cash and the
Profitability of Foreign Acquisitions, 33 CONTEMP. ACCT. RES. 44 (2016).
228. See id.
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Control Variables for Method of Payment Logistic Regressions
Equals firm i's market value of equity in year t, as
measured by the current share price times the
number of shares outstanding, plus current
liabilities, long-term liabilities, deferred taxes,
investment tax credits, and the liquidation value of
MTBiot preferred stock all scaled by total assets in year t.
The natural logarithm of firm i's market value of
LN_MARKETit equity.
The difference in the yields of Baa-rated bonds and
INTRISKot ten-year treasury bonds for year t.
AAAi,t The yield on Aaa-rated bonds for year t.
GNP, in trillions, during the year preceding year t.
GNP,,t Chained to 1992 dollars.
The standard deviation in sales growth across
INDSHCKit industries for the two years preceding year t.
The change in corporate net cash flows from the
calendar year preceding quarter t to the calendar
CHGCASHi,t year including year t.
The ratio of the one-year interest rate on treasury
bonds to the ten-year interest rate on treasury bonds
STINT/LTINTit for year t.
The value of the acquisition transaction scaled by
firm i's market value of equity at the time of the last
REL SIZEi,t annual report prior to the announcement date.
Is an indicator variable that equals one if the
acquirer is a serial acquirer, defined as a firm
making more than five acquisitions during our
SERIALt sample period and zero otherwise.
Equals the natural logarithm of the number of days
between the merger announcement date and the
TIMEi, effective date.
Control Variables for OLS PERF Regressions
Is an indicator variable set equal to one if the target
PUBLICij is public and zero otherwise.
ROAit Equals firm i's income scaled by assets.
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